November 2015 Archives by subject

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Starting: Sun Nov 1 00:20:09 EDT 2015
Ending: Mon Nov 30 20:49:13 EST 2015
Messages: 410

• [Cryptography] [cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   Allen
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   RB
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] Paris Attacks Blamed on Strong Cryptography and Edward Snowden   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] Paris Attacks Blamed on Strong Cryptography and Edward Snowden   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Watson Ladd
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jonathan Thornburg
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] ADDITIONAL COMSEC HISTORY DECLASSIFIED UPDATED: A History of U.S. Communication   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] ADMIN Re: How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] ADMIN Re: Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] ADMIN Reminders   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] And it goes on...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] And it goes on...   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] And it goes on...   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] And it goes on...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Ismail Kizir
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Natanael
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Ismail Kizir
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Ismail Kizir
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Ismail Kizir
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] A new, fast and "unbreakable" encryption algorithm   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] A Paris Cryptographer On Encryption and Terrorists   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Benjamin Kreuter
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Benjamin Kreuter
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] Are zero knowledge authentication systems safe?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Atomic level precision applied to quantum computers   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   John Denker
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   Natanael
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   John Denker
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   Sandy Harris
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   Dennis E. Hamilton
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   John Denker
• [Cryptography] basic cryptography ... was: key breaking   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Bear Bonds - a new crytpocurrency   allen at bearbonds.org
• [Cryptography] Bear Bonds - a new crytpocurrency   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Bear Bonds - a new crytpocurrency   allen at bearbonds.org
• [Cryptography] Bear Bonds - a new crytpocurrency   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Bear Bonds - a new crytpocurrency   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Bin Laden satphones   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Bin Laden satphones   Watson Ladd
• [Cryptography] Bin Laden satphones   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Bin Laden satphones   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Satoshi Nakamoto
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Bryan Bishop
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Bitcoin blocksize limit can be removed   Peter Todd
• [Cryptography] Bright undergrad needed for short IoT encrypt'n consult gig   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Bright undergrad needed for short IoT encrypt'n consult gig   John Ioannidis
• [Cryptography] Burner phone == One Time (i)Pad   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Burner phone == One Time (i)Pad   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Re: Burner phone == One Time (i)Pad   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Burner phone == One Time (i)Pad   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Chrome dropping DHE (was Re: [FORGED] Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Clipperz   Stéphane Mourey
• [Cryptography] Clipperz   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Clipperz   Jonas Magazinius
• [Cryptography] Clipperz   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Clipperz   Jonas Magazinius
• [Cryptography] Clouds that can't reign   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Crackdown on *rental vehicles* expected after terrorist attacks   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   Guus Sliepen
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   Markus Wanner
• [Cryptography] Cryptogit   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] crypto strength ... was: ratcheting DH strengths over time   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Curious about FIDO Alliance authentication scheme   Thierry Moreau
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Watson Ladd
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Sandy Harris
• [Cryptography] Dan Bernstein has a new blog entry on key breaking   Patrick Chkoreff
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Philip Gladstone
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Chris Tonkinson
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Dells are shipping with a rogue root level CA cert   ianG
• [Cryptography] Diffie-Hellman after the Logjam paper versus IETF RFCs ...   Thierry Moreau
• [Cryptography] Does anyone use ZKP systems based on graph isomorphism?   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Does anyone use ZKP systems based on graph isomorphism?   Jonathan Katz
• Encryption Backdoors won�t make us safer from terrorism. They might do the opposite.   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Fatal flaw in 'Algebraic Eraser' ?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Fighting fear (of encryption) with fear (of bad encryption)   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Fighting fear (of encryption) with fear (of bad encryption)   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] Fighting fear (of encryption) with fear (of bad encryption)   ianG
• [Cryptography] Fighting fear (of encryption) with fear (of bad encryption)   Mathieu Bourrier
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Pearl Harbor and Crypto   Donald Eastlake
• [Cryptography] Fwd: PHC winner release   stargrave at stargrave.org
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Nicholas Bohm
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: Post Quantum Crypto   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Greenwald: Why the CIA is smearing encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Donald Michie!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Happy Birthday, No Such Agency!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] How programming language design ca help us write secure crypto code   Dennis E. Hamilton
• [Cryptography] How programming language design ca help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jonathan Thornburg
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Mansour Moufid
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Nemo
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   dj at deadhat.com
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Brian Gladman
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   ianG
• [Cryptography] How programming language design can help us write secure crypto code   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] HTTPS usage at major media sites   John Denker
• [Cryptography] HTTPS usage at major media sites   Darren Moffat
• [Cryptography] I sent out a Be Nice announcement   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to ai d would-be terrorists with encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] ISIS has ‘help desk’ to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   ianG
• ISIS has �help desk� to aid would-be terrorists with encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] ISIS OPSEC Manual Debunked?   John Young
• [Cryptography] ISIS OPSEC Manual Debunked?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] ISIS OPSEC Manual Debunked?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] ISIS OPSEC Manual Debunked?   John Ioannidis
• [Cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   John Young
• [Cryptography] ISIS’ OPSEC Manual   John Ioannidis
• ISIS� OPSEC Manual   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Will Sargent
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Allen
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   ianG
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Max Kington
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Will Sargent
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   ianG
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Krisztián Pintér
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Will Sargent
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Krisztián Pintér
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Krisztián Pintér
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Max Kington
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Kristian Gjøsteen
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Sandy Harris
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Ron Leach
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   ianG
• [Cryptography] Literature on reusing same key for AES / HMAC?   ianG
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Max Kington
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Gé Weijers
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)   dan at geer.org
• [Cryptography] Microsoft releasing quantum computing simulator   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   D. Hugh Redelmeier
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Watson Ladd
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Nvidia- one Tflop could change the rules quicker than quantum...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] NY DA Vance's 'Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety'   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] NY DA Vance's 'Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety'   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] NY DA Vance's 'Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety'   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] observations: Let's Encrypt certificate authority: free, automated, opensource, limited beta   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto   Donald Eastlake
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto (was Re: ISIS has ‘help desk’ to ai d would-be terrorists with encryption)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Re: Pearl Harbor and Crypto (was Re: ISIS has ‘help desk’ to ai d would-be terrorists with encryption)   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Pearl Harbor and Crypto (was Re: ISIS has ‘help desk’ to ai d would-be terrorists with encryption)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Police Chiefs & Prosecutors Seek Access to Encrypted Comms   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Kristian Gjøsteen
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Krisztián Pintér
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Allen
• [Cryptography] Post Quantum Crypto   Jonathan Thornburg
• [Cryptography] Purposely weakening encryption "because Paris"   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Ransomware: Newest viral marketing gimmick ?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Ransomware: Newest viral marketing gimmick ?   dan at geer.org
• [Cryptography] Ransomware: Newest viral marketing gimmick ?   John Ioannidis
• [Cryptography] Ransomware: Newest viral marketing gimmick ?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Ransomware: Newest viral marketing gimmick ?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Albert Lunde
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Kyle Rose
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Roland C. Dowdeswell
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time   ianG
• [Cryptography] RIP James Ellis   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] RIP Tommy Flowers   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] RIP Tommy Flowers   ianG
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Allen
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Miroslav Kratochvil
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   John Ioannidis
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Benjamin Kreuter
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   Hubert A. Le Van Gong
• [Cryptography] Sadly predictable: Terrorism used as excuse to attack encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Safe/Unsafe Hashing Algorithms in WinCrypt.h   Ankit Khandelwal
• [Cryptography] safety principles +- security principles   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Satoshi's PGP key.   ianG
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Allen
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Jonathan Thornburg
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Miroslav Kratochvil
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Grant Schultz
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Security of a permute-only system?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Systems Engineering for Safety and Security   Brian Gladman
• [Cryptography] The vultures circle...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] The vultures circle...   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] The vultures circle...   Jan Schaumann
• [Cryptography] UK wants snooping tech feedback by Fri 27 Nov   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Jim Windle
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Hasan Diwan
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Alexis Wattel
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Hubert A. Le Van Gong
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Abe Singer
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] Unencrypted SMS   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] US Congress Vows To Criminalize First Amendment in re Paris   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] US Congress Vows To Criminalize First Amendment in re Paris   Bystroushaak
• [Cryptography] US Congress Vows To Criminalize First Amendment in re Paris   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] US Congress Vows To Criminalize First Amendment in re Paris   Benjamin Kreuter
• [Cryptography] US Congress Vows To Criminalize First Amendment in re Paris   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Verified implementation of TLS: miTLS   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Verified implementation of TLS: miTLS   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] WAPO: Tech industry defends encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] where is the weakness? related-key, mac-then-encrypt, CBC, padding oracle ????   John Denker
• [Cryptography] where is the weakness? related-key, mac-then-encrypt, CBC, padding oracle ????   Kristian Gjøsteen
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Darkpassenger
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Devon Smythe
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Peter Schwabe
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Kerry Thompson
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Darkpassenger
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   beloumi
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Krisztián Pintér
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Dan McDonald
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Allen
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Darkpassenger
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   Brian Gladman
• [Cryptography] Why Rijndael ?   ianG
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Donald Eastlake
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Richard Outerbridge
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] WSJ: WH wants to meet Techies in DC re encryption   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] YubiKeys / FIDO / U2F ??   Tony Arcieri

Last message date: Mon Nov 30 20:49:13 EST 2015
Archived on: Tue Dec 1 07:08:47 EST 2015

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