[Cryptography] Long-term security (was Re: ratcheting DH strengths over time)

Perry E. Metzger perry at piermont.com
Tue Nov 17 09:21:07 EST 2015


On Tue, 17 Nov 2015 02:26:28 -0800 John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> wrote:
> Let's not use this as a great example of how to force users to
> upgrade (to non-working devices they are forbidden to control).

Well, there may be a happy middle here.

For example, one can set defaults reasonably but permit users to
override. I think it might be reasonable for things like home
routers, commercial user-oriented operating systems, etc., to operate
on a "by default, you download and install patches, and the box only
trusts signed code, but if you know how to read the manual and have
physical access you can override that".

The key is to make sure that the average user who has no idea what a
security patch even is can do more or less nothing but be safe, while
the unusual user who does know what they're doing can still do what
they like with the hardware.

Perry
-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com


More information about the cryptography mailing list