[Cryptography] ratcheting DH strengths over time

Ray Dillinger bear at sonic.net
Mon Nov 16 17:10:57 EST 2015



On 11/16/2015 12:34 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:

> If you can determine that your current cryptographic mechanisms are become weak long enough ahead of time that you can trust them to deliver an update ... a solution is, in principle, possible.
> 
> Against a "0-day" attack, only rip out and replace can possibly work.
> 

I am a fan of the "rip out and replace" methodology.  I dislike
systems where everything is so intertwingled that it cannot easily
be done.

When I hear words like "suite" or "toolbox" or "framework" I am
often pleased in other endeavors, but usually consider myself warned
of a hazard in the context of security.

Excessive integration means that in order to rip out and replace
whatever's actually causing the problem you'll probably have to
rip out and replace a lot of things that are working just fine.
It's collateral damage; more work, and more opportunities to get
something wrong.

				Bear


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