February 2016 Archives by thread

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Starting: Mon Feb 1 15:32:13 EST 2016
Ending: Mon Feb 29 22:07:55 EST 2016
Messages: 405

• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Call for participation: Interdisciplinary Summer school on Privacy (ISP 2016)   Jaap-Henk Hoepman
• [Cryptography] NSA re-org and its impact   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] Desirability of standard reference pseudo-codes for essential components of IT-security software   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   mok-kong shen
    • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   david
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   James Cloos
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   david
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Anti-clipper team re-assembles   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Deciphering Old Soviet Hand Cipher   Jim Windle
• [Cryptography] EE380: How to Co mpute with Schrödinger's Cat: An Introduction to Quantum Computing   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Watson Ladd
    • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Kevin W. Wall
    • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Krisztián Pintér
  • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Krisztián Pintér
      • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] New block cipher competition   james hughes
• [Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh   ianG
    • [Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Harry Nyquist!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016   Sean Lynch
• [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   alan at clueserver.org
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Darkpassenger
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantumcomputer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Francisco Corella
  • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Francisco Corella
      • [Cryptography] NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Export controls [was: Re: NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B]   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] Export controls [was: Re: NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B]   Allen
  • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   ianG
    • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] [Cryptograph y] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Francisco Corella
      • [Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B   Peter Fairbrother
• [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Francisco Corella
    • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   The Doctor
  • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Ryan Carboni
      • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ryan Carboni
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Roland C. Dowdeswell
    • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Roland C. Dowdeswell
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode.   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc.   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc.   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] Cryptome�s searing critique of Snowden Inc.   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc.   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Robert Hettinga
  • [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Allen
    • [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Robert Hettinga
      • [Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium   Ángel González
• [Cryptography] Talk on AES-GSM software optimization   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] [ray at unipay.nl: [fc-announce] Call for Participation: FC16 (conference starts in one week)]   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Aram Perez
  • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Harlan Lieberman-Berg
    • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   RB
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   RB
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Aram Perez
  • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Alfie John
  • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This!   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This!   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This!   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This!   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone   Mark Seiden
    • [Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone   Mark Seiden
      • [Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Apple's response to DOJ re encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   RB
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   RB
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   covariant
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco   Allen
• [Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!"   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!"   Erik Granger
    • [Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!"   James S. Tyre
  • [Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!"   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
  • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Bernie Cosell
    • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Richard Outerbridge
  • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] Is Apple correct?   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Michael Kjörling
  • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma   John Denker
• [Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security   Mike Lisanke
• [Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of Terrorist's iPhone   Tamzen Cannoy
  • [Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of Terrorist's iPhone   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] (no subject)   John Young
  • [Cryptography] (no subject)   John Young
    • [Cryptography] (no subject)   Cari Machet
• [Cryptography] The All Writs Act   Allen
• [Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Apple's 10 strikes law   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple's 10 strikes law   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] what about the metadata from Farook's phone(s)?   Mark Seiden
  • [Cryptography] what about the metadata from Farook's phone(s)?   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID   Mark Seiden
  • [Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID   Paul Ferguson
  • [Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Apple versus Open Fabs   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Apple versus Open Fabs   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Apple. Copyright, trade secret and signature.   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Compact smartcard reader with pin entry?   CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
  • [Cryptography] Compact smartcard reader with pin entry?   CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
• [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Allen
  • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   RB
    • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Allen
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   RB
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Allen
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   RB
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Allen
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Allen
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Crypto Beguilement   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptome] Crypto Beguilement   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] 10 Reasons Farook's Work Phone Likely Won't Have Any Evidence   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world?   Radia Perlman
  • [Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world?   Alfie John
  • [Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world?   The Doctor
    • [Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world?   Scott Guthery
• [Cryptography] Doubling the block length of a given block cipher   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Cyber Command - we have nothing to fear, but...   ianG
• [Cryptography] Secure software update protocol?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Secure software update protocol?   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Secure software update protocol?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Secure software update protocol?   Natanael
• [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Walter van Holst
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Walter van Holst
    • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Richard Outerbridge
    • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Richard Outerbridge
    • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom   Matthias Wulfeck
• [Cryptography] Apple's "business model and public brand marketing strategy"   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] DOJ/Apple passcode == "non-encryption additional features"   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes"   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes"   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes"   dj at deadhat.com
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes"   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   Michael Kjörling
    • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   Ángel González
  • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Modes of communication   Bob Wilson
• [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   John Young
  • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Jack Liddy
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Erik Berls
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   John Young
    • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack   Matthias Wulfeck
  • [Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] Kerckhoffs's principle ==? Turing Machine universality   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Matthias Wulfeck
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Allen
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Bob Mahoney
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Andreas Junius
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Chris Tonkinson
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Stephen Farrell
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Jason Cooper
  • [Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] Quantum crypto in the media   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Ian G
  • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Donald Eastlake
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Dmitry Belyavsky
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   ianG
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   james hughes
  • [Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone?   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone?   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone?   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] The FBI doesn't need Apple's help to unlock the phone   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] The FBI doesn't need Apple's help to unlock the phone   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] OFFSystem   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] OFFSystem   Yui Hirasawa
• [Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/...   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/...   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Paul Wouters
  • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] More back doors coming from FBI/DOJ/etc.   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Damned if you don't, even more damned if you do   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Damned if you don't, even more damned if you do   Yui Hirasawa
• [Cryptography] Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Zimmermann telegram   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Judge Orenstein denies USG motion to compel Apple decrypt   John Young
• [Cryptography] House Encryption Hearing statements online   Henry Baker

Last message date: Mon Feb 29 22:07:55 EST 2016
Archived on: Tue Mar 1 00:30:06 EST 2016

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