[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)

[Tom Mitchell]

On Tue, Feb 16, 2016 at 12:04 AM, John Gilmore <gnu at toad.com> wrote:

> > OK, that's not $500m, but the NSA is so deep into the world's
> > financial system that it can practically create money.

 ..

> > despots.  The usual suspects.
>
> You don't have to rob individual humans to create money.  You can
> merely bet against them in markets.
>

I am inclined to lower my paranoia to local coalitions
of agencies.  I am not worried about the NSA but I do
worry about....

Bitcoin transaction connectivity maps as meta data.

The blatant theft that is asset forfeiture or asset seizure has become
in some jurisdictions.  It makes it clear to me that any agency able to
make secret transactions will.   The half billion dollar wallets may
be 'safe' but transactions involving kilo dollars ones would go
unnoticed (unreported).

Reports like this one from Huff-post are numerous but so far
no reports bitcoin liquidation seem to add up.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jag-davies/civil-asset-forfeiture_b_7174238.html
https://www.bemidjistate.edu/academics/departments/political-science/wp-content/uploads/sites/40/2015/05/hedman-thesis.pdf

One risk is money outside the law controlling the enforcement of law.

Bact to quantum computing... a sustained (trickling) flow of keys "freely"
relinquished by
suspects or "phonebook"/"rubber hose" obtained keys or keystroke logging
captures
for small wallets may be the first evidence of a working QC.

The tech of a working QC of sufficient size is not simple, is not
inexpensive
and requires a staff.   The productivity of S. Cray in the early days or
a team the size of "The Soul of a New Machine"  might model the size of
the group of insiders.   Simulators and science need not involve insiders so
secrecy is possible for some time.


-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l
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