February 2016 Archives by subject

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Starting: Mon Feb 1 15:32:13 EST 2016
Ending: Mon Feb 29 22:07:55 EST 2016
Messages: 405

[Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes" Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes" dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] (no subject) John Young
[Cryptography] (no subject) John Young
[Cryptography] (no subject) Cari Machet
[Cryptography] 10 Reasons Farook's Work Phone Likely Won't Have Any Evidence Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Matthias Wulfeck
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone John Levine
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Henry Baker
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ron Garret
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ron Garret
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ron Garret
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Natanael
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Roland C. Dowdeswell
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc. Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] [Cryptograph y] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] [cryptome] Crypto Beguilement grarpamp
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This! Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This! Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Hope Apple Fights This! Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [ray at unipay.nl: [fc-announce] Call for Participation: FC16 (conference starts in one week)] R. Hirschfeld
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] Cicada 3301: 2016 Sean Lynch
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] Anti-clipper team re-assembles Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone? Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] A possible way into an iPhone? Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] Apple's "business model and public brand marketing strategy" Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple's 10 strikes law Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple's 10 strikes law Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Apple's response to DOJ re encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple. Copyright, trade secret and signature. Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma John Denker
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple 3rd Party dilemma grarpamp
[Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack Natanael
[Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack Matthias Wulfeck
[Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple: graphically show users that they are under attack Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone Mark Seiden
[Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone Mark Seiden
[Cryptography] Apple ordered to decrypt cellphone Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!" Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!" Erik Granger
[Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!" James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] Apple Store protest in SF: "Hands Up! Don't Root!" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Apple versus Open Fabs grarpamp
[Cryptography] Apple versus Open Fabs grarpamp
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic John Levine
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] Basic auth a bit too basic Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Call for participation: Interdisciplinary Summer school on Privacy (ISP 2016) Jaap-Henk Hoepman
[Cryptography] Compact smartcard reader with pin entry? CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
[Cryptography] Compact smartcard reader with pin entry? CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
[Cryptography] Crypto Beguilement John Young
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Allen
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Allen
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Cryptographic Regulations by the Department of Commerce has Changed The Doctor
[Cryptography] Cryptomes searing critique of Snowden Inc. John Young
[Cryptography] Cryptome’s searing critique of Snowden Inc. grarpamp
[Cryptography] Cryptome�s searing critique of Snowden Inc. Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Cyber Command - we have nothing to fear, but... ianG
[Cryptography] Damned if you don't, even more damned if you do Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Damned if you don't, even more damned if you do Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] Deciphering Old Soviet Hand Cipher Jim Windle
[Cryptography] Desirability of standard reference pseudo-codes for essential components of IT-security software mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Ron Garret
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security david
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Ron Garret
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security James Cloos
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security david
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security William Allen Simpson
[Cryptography] DH non-prime kills "socat" command security Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] DOJ/Apple passcode == "non-encryption additional features" Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Doubling the block length of a given block cipher mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] EE380: How to Co mpute with Schrödinger's Cat: An Introduction to Quantum Computing Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Allen
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users RB
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Allen
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users RB
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Allen
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users RB
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Allen
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Allen
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users John Levine
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Export controls [was: Re: NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B] Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] Export controls [was: Re: NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B] Allen
[Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of Terrorist's iPhone Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] FBI may have royally screwed up chain of custody of Terrorist's iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Ian G
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Donald Eastlake
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Dmitry Belyavsky
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec james hughes
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Henry Baker
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec ianG
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Natanael
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] From Nicaragua to Snowden - why no national standards should be considered in cryptosec james hughes
[Cryptography] Fwd: "On-chip random key generation done using carbon nanotubes" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, Harry Nyquist! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Aram Perez
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Harlan Lieberman-Berg
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Aram Perez
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Alfie John
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Allen
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! RB
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Allen
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! RB
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Allen
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Allen
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Natanael
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Hope Apple Fights This! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] House Encryption Hearing statements online Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Bernie Cosell
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Is Apple correct? Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Judge Orenstein denies USG motion to compel Apple decrypt John Young
[Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Roland C. Dowdeswell
[Cryptography] Justify the sequence of operations in CTR mode. Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Kerckhoffs's principle ==? Turing Machine universality Henry Baker
[Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/... Henry Baker
[Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/... Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Modes of communication Bob Wilson
[Cryptography] More back doors coming from FBI/DOJ/etc. Henry Baker
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Henry Baker
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Krisztián Pintér
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Krisztián Pintér
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition Bill Cox
[Cryptography] New block cipher competition james hughes
[Cryptography] NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B John Gilmore
[Cryptography] NSA's FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Allen
[Cryptography] NSA re-org and its impact Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Hanno Böck
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B ianG
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] NSA’s FAQs Demystify the Demise of Suite B Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple Henry Baker
[Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] OCR'd DOJ Motion to Compel Apple Ron Garret
[Cryptography] OFFSystem grarpamp
[Cryptography] OFFSystem Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] Once again: Tor timing attacks and a Tor confession grarpamp
[Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] On the false choice between privacy and security Mike Lisanke
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications Ángel González
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Practicality of codebook in current-day secret communications mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) alan at clueserver.org
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Darkpassenger
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) John Levine
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) grarpamp
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) ianG
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantumcomputer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet) Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Quantum crypto in the media Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Matthias Wulfeck
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Allen
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Bob Mahoney
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Andreas Junius
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Natanael
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Chris Tonkinson
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Jason Cooper
[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Henry Baker
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Henry Baker
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Jon Callas
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Henry Baker
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Jon Callas
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Henry Baker
[Cryptography] RIP Claude Shannon Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Secure software update protocol? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Secure software update protocol? Allen
[Cryptography] Secure software update protocol? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Secure software update protocol? Natanael
[Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Senator drafting bill to criminalize Apple’s refusal to aid decryption Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Talk on AES-GSM software optimization Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] The All Writs Act Allen
[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID Mark Seiden
[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID Henry Baker
[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID Paul Ferguson
[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Ron Garret
[Cryptography] The FBI doesn't need Apple's help to unlock the phone John Levine
[Cryptography] The FBI doesn't need Apple's help to unlock the phone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh ianG
[Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] The Mathematical Mesh Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco RB
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco RB
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco covariant
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Allen
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Robert Hettinga
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Allen
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Robert Hettinga
[Cryptography] True Micropayments with Bitcoin — Medium Ángel González
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order John Young
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Henry Baker
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Jack Liddy
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Henry Baker
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Henry Baker
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order John Levine
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Ron Garret
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Ron Garret
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order John Young
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Henry Baker
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order Erik Berls
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order John Levine
[Cryptography] what about the metadata from Farook's phone(s)? Mark Seiden
[Cryptography] what about the metadata from Farook's phone(s)? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world? Radia Perlman
[Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world? Alfie John
[Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world? The Doctor
[Cryptography] Where are zero knowledge proofs actually used in the real world? Scott Guthery
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Henry Baker
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto John Levine
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Henry Baker
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Henry Baker
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Jon Callas
[Cryptography] XOR linked list & crypto Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct John Levine
[Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Yes, Apple is correct Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Zimmermann telegram Dave Horsfall

Last message date: Mon Feb 29 22:07:55 EST 2016
Archived on: Tue Mar 1 00:30:06 EST 2016

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