[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users

[RB]

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 5:52 AM, Allen <allenpmd at gmail.com> wrote:
> As long as manufacturers like Apple insist on controlling the keys to the phone, they will be required open it when subject to a warrant.

I'm genuinely curious what solution you might suggest that would be
secure and immune to compulsion while remaining sufficiently
profitable that companies would engage in it.  While interesting, your
suggestion of perfectly anonymous updates that are incapable of
uniquely identifying a device eliminates the majority of the
environment's profitability and therefore manufacturers' incentive to
participate.

This has already happened with the PC market - hardware itself is
barely profitable (if at all) for non-component manufacturers (e.g.
Dell).  Ancillary services and integration are where the profits are,
and if a company is unable to determine if a user is even a paying
customer, they're not going to provide a service.  To keep with the
current example, Apple is not going to willingly provide software that
they then must support to a device they can't even be certain they
manufactured.