[Cryptography] Response to "I don't have anything to hide"

[Natanael]

Den 26 feb 2016 03:09 skrev "Matthias Wulfeck" <matthias.wulfeck at gmail.com>:
>
> > "Do you want the government to have free access to your phone"?
>
> > "I don't have anything to hide. They can look at they want."
>
> I'm sure many of us who have tried to explain the backdoor problem to
their friends and family have heard this response to the question
>
> Part of building support for Apple and fighting the backdoor is a grass
roots effort to educate our friends of the real risk here (as we see them).
>
> I figure I would toss this question out and seek advice from the general
community. How do you respond to "I don't have anything to hide"? How do
you explain to non-technical (and non-paranoid) friends of what's really at
stake?

My response would be something like this (fortunately most people near me
aren't *that* naive, so I've never had this "speech" in person);

It is not up to *you* to decide what should be hidden it not. You aren't
the one deciding which actions are to be labeled right or wrong.

Is it your own trustworthy brother or mother that's sitting over there in
the intelligence agency's analysis team or target selection board? Or is it
a complete stranger with morals and agendas and goals and orders that you
don't know, that may be in conflict with yours?

Do you think that your digital trails can not be twisted to be used against
you? Or why not to be used as leverage against your family and friends if
*they* would happen to catch their eyes? Have you not seen or heard of the
examples of exactly that happening before?

Knowledge accumulates.

The more total the knowledge is, the more powerful leverage it can provide.
Even knowledge has network effects (predictive power grows fast). You do
not want the wrong people to get access to that kind of leverage and to be
utterly unaccountable for their actions.

---

Then you can follow up with sources on proven abuse of surveillance. Like
NSA's loveint, leaked surveillance footage, Snowden documents, etc...

Even if they want them to have access, they must understand that this
demands actively maintained accountability and oversight. If they're not
willing to work continously to verify that, then the default response
should be encryption and other privacy protecting methods.

You either watch them, or you watch out for yourself. (or both)
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