[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco

Phillip Hallam-Baker phill at hallambaker.com
Fri Feb 19 12:20:42 EST 2016


On Fri, Feb 19, 2016 at 9:32 AM, Theodore Ts'o <tytso at mit.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 17, 2016 at 06:30:46PM -0700, RB wrote:
>> My cynical conjecture is that for Apple this isn't really about
>> securing devices.  Rather, it's about minimizing their legal
>> obligations and entanglements.  My further conjecture is that the FBI
>> is attempting to set precedent while they still can, when a trivially
>> bypassed device like the 5c is on the market and they can make the
>> case that the cost of entry is not that high.  They see the door
>> closing as easily as the rest of us, and are trying to get a foot in
>> before it's too late.
>
> Even for a system where the door is "slammed shut", what if in the
> next case, the FBI serves Apple with a warrant in a secret court
> demanding that the All Writs Act gets used to record the passcode when
> the (alive) user enters it, then squirts all of the data over the
> network to the FBI?
>
> Resisting in this case would be good, even if all it does is that it
> forces to FBI stipulates that it only applies for this very narrow
> fact pattern --- sort of like when the Supreme Court stole the
> presidential election, they were so embarrassed by what they did that
> they had to explicitly disclaim that this should be considered a
> binding precedent for future cases.

I have no problem with Apple resisting the subpoena. What I take issue
with is their rhetoric.

The fact is that this is a phone that has a backdoor in it. The
backdoor exists. It is there in the phone already and it will continue
to exist irregardless of the outcome of the case.

Having created a phone with a backdoor, Apple is now arguing that it
should not be required to open it. And to make its argument it is
blurring the distinction between being ordered to open an existing
backdoor and being ordered to create a backdoor.

I don't see that Apple can expect to avoid opening the backdoor that
is already in the phone. There is no end of precedent for that.


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