[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users

RB aoz.syn at gmail.com
Mon Feb 22 15:32:51 EST 2016


On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Allen <allenpmd at gmail.com> wrote:
> signed by trusted persons in a jurisdiction that doesn't permit government-ordered back doors.

I'm not aware that sort of jurisdiction even exists.  Could you help
point out a jurisdiction that is so forward-thinking as well as
relatively immune to economic and literal warfare?  Said individuals
would also be plausibly subject to direct coercion, no matter their
jurisdiction.

Government-ordered literal back doors like this are not a known norm
in the states, hence why Apple is fighting the ruling.  One
yet-incomplete court decision does not yet change that, and I expect
Apple will appeal it as high as the court system lets them.

The only significant difference between what you've outlined and what
exists today is that Apple's source is closed.  Trusted individuals
(you may not trust them but there are millions that do) in a
jurisdiction that has not historically allowed government-ordered back
doors are signing reviewed and tested updates for general consumption.
Their jurisdiction is trying to change that scenario, and that's
what's creating the furor.

That said, however interesting this thread of discussion is I feel
we've strayed far afield from the list's charter and largely by my own
doing.  Therefore, I'm recusing myself from further pursuit of the
topic.


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