[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)

[Ray Dillinger]

On 02/09/2016 08:49 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of
> attacking public key crypto (yet)


Your proof would be valid if the device were widely accessible to
people in the NSA.  But if it exists, then I'd be confident that
it is not widely accessible.  I would presume instead that if it
exists at all it's a high-level compartmental security item, with
"need to know" limited to at most a few dozen people, all of whom
have security dogs sniffing their butts all day long.

Knowing *that* it had been used would effectively alert the
higher ups to *who* had used it, and that destroys the illusion
of unaccountability and expectation of profit, limiting the
potential malefactors to political idealists who are in it for
other reasons.  It'd be more credible and harder to deny, for
example, than just leaking some docs to the press. But doing
it would mean never being able to spend the money and going to
jail for life.

Not saying profit-motivated abuse couldn't happen by any means,
but it'd be a heck of a lot riskier than "Use QC, collect $500M."
Along the way any malefactor who hoped to profit would have to
get a very solid alibi and plant some very compelling evidence
to convince absolutely everyone of the guilt of one of a very
small set of highly vetted coworkers.  Account for the fact that
both the malefactor and those coworkers are under scrutiny 24/7,
and that gets really difficult.

None of this means they have a QC of course.  It means only that
institutional corruption combined with a lack of easily perceived
abuse, isn't a sufficient proof that they don't.

				Bear

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