[Cryptography] Thoughts on the Apple iPhone fiasco

Theodore Ts'o tytso at mit.edu
Fri Feb 19 09:32:54 EST 2016


On Wed, Feb 17, 2016 at 06:30:46PM -0700, RB wrote:
> My cynical conjecture is that for Apple this isn't really about
> securing devices.  Rather, it's about minimizing their legal
> obligations and entanglements.  My further conjecture is that the FBI
> is attempting to set precedent while they still can, when a trivially
> bypassed device like the 5c is on the market and they can make the
> case that the cost of entry is not that high.  They see the door
> closing as easily as the rest of us, and are trying to get a foot in
> before it's too late.

Even for a system where the door is "slammed shut", what if in the
next case, the FBI serves Apple with a warrant in a secret court
demanding that the All Writs Act gets used to record the passcode when
the (alive) user enters it, then squirts all of the data over the
network to the FBI?

Resisting in this case would be good, even if all it does is that it
forces to FBI stipulates that it only applies for this very narrow
fact pattern --- sort of like when the Supreme Court stole the
presidential election, they were so embarrassed by what they did that
they had to explicitly disclaim that this should be considered a
binding precedent for future cases.

						- Ted


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