[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order

[Tom Mitchell]

On Fri, Feb 26, 2016 at 8:13 AM, Henry Baker <hbaker1 at pipeline.com> wrote:

> At 07:40 PM 2/25/2016, Richard Outerbridge wrote:
> >> On 2016-02-25 (56), at 19:34:50, Henry Baker <hbaker1 at pipeline.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> At 01:48 PM 2/25/2016, John Young wrote:
> >>> USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order <
> https://t.co/ZOvJXNs0Bx>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/usg-apple-016.pdf
> (415 pp, 19.5MB)
> >>
> >> So Apple's reply is 9x the size of DOJ's motion.
> >
> >OK, so I'm an overall ignorant Canuck Canadian.
> >
> >Doesn't this all boil down to a 2nd Amendment argument?
> ....
> It would be quite interesting for DOJ to publicly stipulate that NSA could
> (or could not) break into iOS 8 or 9.
>
> This is truly a sticky wicket, since the intelligence community is
> generally prohibited from working on domestic issues.
>

Well the implication is that there are connections to international agents
of terror.  So the NSA might be involved up to the point that it is already
known what is on the phone but authorities are unable or unwilling to
present the information to a domestic court without exposing methods and
abilities (or illegal acts).

N.B. if it got to the DOJ making a public statement about the NSA -- they
would withdraw the request before the judge.   A number of agencies keep
interesting law outside of the courts by complying with a legal request or
withdrawing a prosecution.   Since a legal interaction is expensive those
with cash and time get one type of service.   The Miranda bit of an
attourney will be appointed only applies to criminal law.  Civil law in the
US is biased toward those with cash or members of the bar.

I might note the Win-10 optional feature of a four number pin on the lock
screen for local access.   What you know and what you are is an interesting
line.
The PIN screen option might be easy to automate and attack.

-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l
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