[Cryptography] USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order

Henry Baker hbaker1 at pipeline.com
Fri Feb 26 11:13:47 EST 2016


At 07:40 PM 2/25/2016, Richard Outerbridge wrote:
>> On 2016-02-25 (56), at 19:34:50, Henry Baker <hbaker1 at pipeline.com> wrote:
>> 
>> At 01:48 PM 2/25/2016, John Young wrote:
>>> USG v. Apple, Apple Motion to Vacate Decrypt Order <https://t.co/ZOvJXNs0Bx>https://cryptome.org/2016/02/usg-apple-016.pdf (415 pp, 19.5MB)
>> 
>> So Apple's reply is 9x the size of DOJ's motion.
>
>OK, so I'm an overall ignorant Canuck Canadian.
>
>Doesn't this all boil down to a 2nd Amendment argument?

The All Writs Act also requires that the govt prove to the Court that the 3rd party's efforts are *required* -- i.e., that the govt has *exhausted* all other means to achieve the desired result.  In particular, that *all* departments of the govt have been consulted, and *none* of them has the required capabilities.

"Moreover, the government has not made any showing that it sought or received technical assistance from other federal agencies with expertise in digital forensics, which assistance might obviate the need to conscript Apple to create the back door it now seeks."

"Judge Orenstein [was] asking the government 'to make a representation for purposes of the All Writs Act' as to whether the 'entire Government', including the 'intelligence community', did or did not have the capability to decrypt an iPhone, and the government responding that 'federal prosecutors don't have an obligation to consult the intelligence community in order to investigate crime'."

If this interpretation of the All Writs Act is upheld, then the DOJ will have to consult with the intelligence community prior to compelling companies like Apple to decrypt phones.

It would be quite interesting for DOJ to publicly stipulate that NSA could (or could not) break into iOS 8 or 9.

This is truly a sticky wicket, since the intelligence community is generally prohibited from working on domestic issues.



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