[Cryptography] eliminating manufacturer's ability to backdoor users

John Levine johnl at iecc.com
Mon Feb 22 16:34:54 EST 2016


>> Government-ordered literal back doors like this are not a known norm
>> in the states, hence why Apple is fighting the ruling.  One
>> yet-incomplete court decision does not yet change that, and I expect
>> Apple will appeal it as high as the court system lets them.
>
>Government-mandated back doors are the norm in the USA.  The law is known
>as CALEA and at the moment it applies only to telecommunication providers.
>See
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act

It's a norm for regulated and licensed telecommunication providers,
which Apple is not.  But safe makers don't have to provide a master
key to the government, and neither should Apple.

>IMO, the best protection is going to be found in technology, and how it is
>used (i.e., the purpose of this list), not in Congress and not in the
>courts.

I agree the argument would be a lot shorter if the true response is
"we can't do it."

R's,
John


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