[Cryptography] Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of attacking public key crypto (yet)

ianG iang at iang.org
Mon Feb 15 20:43:16 EST 2016


On 10/02/2016 04:49 am, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> Proof that the NSA does not have a quantum computer capable of
> attacking public key crypto (yet)
>
>
> A) Assume that the NSA has such a machine.
>
>  From A it follows that the machine can be used to forge bitcoin transfers.
>
> B) Large areas of the bitcoin mining pool have never been spent.

Well, not transferred at least.  But the moment they are transferred, 
you can expect all hell to break loose.  Hardly your average NSA 
clandestine operation ;)


> A,B) Anyone with a QC could use it to break the keys of the wallets
> holding $500 million.


If NSA had a QC machine it would be the nation's best kept secret.  It 
would be like Engima, Bletchley Park, Purple and all that.  Massive 
rings of control surrounding it to make sure it never never EVER leaked 
out, whole departments running deception operations.

Secondly, $500m is chumpchange.  Thirdly, the NSA can hack into so many 
bitcoin computers it could probably pick up a few mil by lunchtime.

OK, that's not $500m, but the NSA is so deep into the world's financial 
system that it can practically create money.  Any time it needs funds 
all it has to do is steal the pots of various known and identified 
vulnerable parties - drugs barons, oligarchs in exile, US politicians 
who haven't approved NSA budget increases, Syrian despots.  The usual 
suspects.


> C) This has not happened.


It will *never happen*.  The other dirty secret is that these supposedly 
anonymous and private payment systems (cof) have always been well 
supported by *some* agencies but not by others.  One of the reasons that 
e-gold went quietly into the night is that digging too deep found too 
many "interesting characters" from both sides of the tracks.  All of the 
spooks everywhere have a vested interest in keeping things like Bitcoin 
alive.  It's not personal, moral or legal, it's just the way the great 
game works.


> D) The NSA has awful internal security, (see Snowden). NSA resources
> are known to have been diverted for LOVINT. It is unlikely NSA
> employees are more honest than those of federal law enforcement whose
> investigator ripped off the Silk Road operator for at least half a
> million. The third in command at the CIA was recently prosecuted and
> copped a plea for participating in the 'Duke' Cunningham bribery ring
> poker and prostitutes parties at the Watergate. Oh and Secret
> Service... need I go on.


The notion that someone was busted for a poker game raises just one 
question in my mind - what was he really being busted for?



iang



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