[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID
Paul Ferguson
fergdawgster at mykolab.com
Sat Feb 20 19:52:34 EST 2016
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On 2/20/2016 4:07 PM, Mark Seiden wrote:
> so now we discover that if you have an unchanged password on your
> AppleID and you log on from a known network (known to the phone)
> the phone will then automatically back up to the Apple Cloud and
> that backup will contain the current content of the phone.
>
> But some clod at San Bernadino County changed the password for
> Farook's AppleID (somehow without knowing the old password) 12
> hours after the phone was recovered by the government.
>
> So why doesn't Apple just go to its backups and restore the hash of
> the old password and the timestamp of the last password reset?
> and then the government can force a backup which Apple can
> provide?
Most likely because the FBI and the DoJ probably want to establish a
precedent here which can be leveraged in the future.
- - ferg
>
> Problem solved, End of World Averted, Peace and Harmony in the
> iphone world again (except now we all know Apple is still a trusted
> party in this entire ecosystem).
>
> _______________________________________________ The cryptography
> mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com
> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
>
- --
Paul Ferguson
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Key fingerprint: 19EC 2945 FEE8 D6C8 58A1 CE53 2896 AC75 54DC 85B2
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