[Cryptography] the consequences of changing the password on your AppleID

Paul Ferguson fergdawgster at mykolab.com
Sat Feb 20 19:52:34 EST 2016


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On 2/20/2016 4:07 PM, Mark Seiden wrote:

> so now we discover that if you have an unchanged password on your 
> AppleID and you log on from a known network (known to the phone) 
> the phone will then automatically back up to the Apple Cloud and
> that backup will contain the current content of the phone.
> 
> But some clod at San Bernadino County changed the password for 
> Farook's AppleID (somehow without knowing the old password) 12
> hours after the phone was recovered by the government.
> 
> So why doesn't Apple just go to its backups and restore the hash of
> the old password and the timestamp of the last password reset?
> and then the government can force a backup which Apple can
> provide?

Most likely because the FBI and the DoJ probably want to establish a
precedent here which can be leveraged in the future.

- - ferg

> 
> Problem solved, End of World Averted, Peace and Harmony in the 
> iphone world again (except now we all know Apple is still a trusted
> party in this entire ecosystem).
> 
> _______________________________________________ The cryptography
> mailing list cryptography at metzdowd.com 
> http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
> 


- -- 
Paul Ferguson
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