[Cryptography] 1x pad: the elephant in the Apple/DOJ courtroom

Tom Mitchell mitch at niftyegg.com
Tue Feb 23 18:20:14 EST 2016


On Tue, Feb 23, 2016 at 10:49 AM, Henry Baker <hbaker1 at pipeline.com> wrote:
...

> Although DOJ/FBI claims that this case is "targeted" at a single phone, we
> all know that this is a bald-faced lie; they are setting a precedent that
> will open up a billion+ cellphones around the world for routine mass
> surveillance.
>

The DOJ/FBI do not make this claim (no written lie) .  The writ states that
this service depends on a lawful court order to be done.  It fails to
restate the obvious that a court can make this demand again (rinse lather
repeat).   Some press conference coverage edits are newsworthy but
inaccurate.  This court cannot constrain other courts or individuals from
asking again and again.

Strictly once the service is established nothing prevents Apple from
selling it to others.
Corporate trade secrets for big pharmacy come to mind.  As per your
employment contract
hand over your phones and wait.

i.e. The court order states that there is no law covering this service and
technology so the court is not limited by existing law. Neither is Apple
bound.    The lack of laws allows Apple to sell the service to anyone
domestic or international with or without proof of ownership of the device.
  The court order assert Apple is not reading the data so should Apple
hobble the
authentication screen as requested (or more) for a foreign agent on a phone
presented for the service that might have been "found" at the Foggy Bottom
station they can.  Then the device transported to a jurisdiction where
hacking it is not
illegal.

The warrant stated that this is not different than an OS update.  Nothing
precludes Apple from future updates to their software of any nature.  It is
different in interesting ways but the warrant in isolation ignores the rest
of the camel once the nose is allowed under the tent.

In my heart of hearts the FBI and Department of Justice should be cautious
of what they ask.


-- 
  T o m    M i t c h e l l
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