February 2015 Archives by thread

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Starting: Sun Feb 1 03:18:50 EST 2015
Ending: Sat Feb 28 22:35:45 EST 2015
Messages: 372

• [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Alfonso De Gregorio
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Paul Wouters
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   ianG
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Best Practices for Passwords   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Best Practices for Passwords   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Arnold Reinhold
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   ianG
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Randy Bush
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   ianG
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Ángel González
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Ralph Holz
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   ianG
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] where is crypto going in the next decade?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Andreas Junius
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Adrian McCullagh
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   alex at alten.org
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Philipp Gühring
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   alex at alten.org
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   alex at alten.org
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Capability Myths Demolished was: Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Capability Myths Demolished was: Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Capability Myths Demolished was: Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Do capabilities work? Do ACLs work?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by Secure?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   ianG
      • [Cryptography] What do we mean by ... ???   Barney Wolff
  • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] best practices considered bad term   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC?   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC?   ianG
• [Cryptography] How the CIA Made Google   ianG
  • [Cryptography] How the CIA Made Google   ianG
• [Cryptography] De-Anonymizing   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Wrong uses of filesystem encryption   Michael Kjörling
  • [Cryptography] Wrong uses of filesystem encryption   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC?, and sunlight   Robert L Wilson
  • [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC?, and sunlight   Salz, Rich
    • [Cryptography] traffic analysis -> let's write an RFC?, and sunlight   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   ianG
    • [Cryptography] crypto standards and principles   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Peter Vils Hansen
    • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   William Arbaugh
  • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] The World’s Email Encryption Software Relies on One Guy, Who is Going Broke   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Security vulnerabilities in BMW's ConnectedDrive   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Security vulnerabilities in BMW's ConnectedDrive   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] Security vulnerabilities in BMW's ConnectedDrive   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Security vulnerabilities in BMW's ConnectedDrive   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] ODNI Counsel: Governments Want Accessible Crypto from Business   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] ODNI Counsel: Governments Want Accessible Crypto from Business   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] ODNI Counsel: Governments Want Accessible Crypto from Business   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Business Wants Accessible Crypto from Business   John Young
• [Cryptography] Question on crypto implementation in existing python libraries   Robert Musser
  • [Cryptography] Question on crypto implementation in existing python libraries   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] Question on crypto implementation in existing python libraries   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Question on crypto implementation in existing python libraries   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Pre-release version of Bitcoin whitepaper   James Evans
• [Cryptography] Why Should[n't] I Work for the NSA?   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Crypto Trick Makes Software Nearly Impossible to Reverse-Engineer   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Trick Makes Software Nearly Impossible to Reverse-Engineer   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Trick Makes Software Nearly Impossible to Reverse-Engineer   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] RAM needed for zero knowledge proofs   Jan Carlsson
• [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Christian Huitema
    • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Steve Furlong
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   John Ioannidis
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Andy Steingruebl
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Jim Gettys
    • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] phishing attack again - $300m in losses?   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Encryption used to secure transports is used to hide data exfiltration   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Encryption used to secure transports is used to hide data exfiltration   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Encryption used to secure transports is used to hide data exfiltration   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Information. it's the real thing   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Paul Ferguson
    • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   David Johnston
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Ryan Carboni
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] trojans in the firmware   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Dan McDonald
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Peter Vils Hansen
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Abe Singer
      • [Cryptography] trojans in your printers   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Ryan Carboni
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] PGP word list   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] PGP word list   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] PGP word list   Nicholas Bohm
    • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Arnold Reinhold
    • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Equation Group Multiple Malware Program, NSA Implicated   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   ianG
  • [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   Adam Gibson
    • [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   Albert Puigsech Galicia
      • [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   Adam Gibson
  • [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   Emin Gün Sirer
    • [Cryptography] self-MITMing my own TLS connection ...   dansmith
• [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Kent Borg
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Benjamin Kreuter
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Rob Meijer
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Kent Borg
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Jon Spriggs
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Alec Muffett
  • [Cryptography] Passwords: Perfect, except for being Flawed   Rob Meijer
• [Cryptography] Extracting Equation Group's malware from hard drives   Alfie John
  • [Cryptography] Extracting Equation Group's malware from hard drives   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Firmware exploits summary   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Exhibition of German Enigma Code Machines   Scott Guthery
      • [Cryptography] A better random number generator...   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Christian Barcenas
  • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   John Young
    • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   John Young
    • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Paul Wouters
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   William Muriithi
    • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Compromised SIMs, was Lenovo   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] forward secrecy   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] Lenovo laptops with preloaded adware and an evil CA   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Superfish removal   Tamzen Cannoy
• Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound’ Memory Card   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound’ Memory Card   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound’ Memory Card   Joseph Ashwood
    • [Cryptography] Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound’ Memory Card   RB
    • [Cryptography] Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound’ Memory Card   John Ioannidis
    • [Cryptography] Sony to Offer ‘Premium Sound ’ Memory Card   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Infosec Excuse Bingo   ianG
• [Cryptography] Smart Phone Tracking   Jim Windle
• [Cryptography] Quarter-million dollar bounty for key crack....   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Quarter-million dollar bounty for key crack....   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Claude Shannon   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] Claude Shannon   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Peter Vils Hansen
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] information, Shannon, and quantum mechanics   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Rotor wiring on the Enigma   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] Rotor wiring on the Enigma   Richard Outerbridge
    • [Cryptography] Rotor wiring on the Enigma   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Robert L Wilson
  • [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Dave Horsfall
    • [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] My ignorance and drive firmware hacking   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] REAL-ID Phone Access Coming Soon   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Why the Internet could be the next “failed state”   Paul Ferguson
• [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] The Crypto Bone's Threat Model   Chris Kuethe
• [Cryptography] Layering Web Encryption?   Chris Tonkinson
  • [Cryptography] Layering Web Encryption?   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Layering Web Encryption?   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Layering Web Encryption?   Chris Tonkinson
• [Cryptography] RNG's available in disk devices   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   The Doctor
  • [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Cheap forensic recorder   John Denker
• [Cryptography] DIME // Pending Questions // Seeking Your Input   Ladar Levison
  • [Cryptography] DIME // Pending Questions // Seeking Your Input   ianG
  • [Cryptography] DIME // Pending Questions // Seeking Your Input   Hasan Diwan
    • [Cryptography] DIME // Pending Questions // Seeking Your Input   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Encrypted QR Codes Could Keep Devices Safe   Henry Baker

Last message date: Sat Feb 28 22:35:45 EST 2015
Archived on: Sun Mar 1 02:23:58 EST 2015

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