October 2013 Archives by thread

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Starting: Tue Oct 1 00:36:27 EDT 2013
Ending: Thu Oct 31 22:22:17 EDT 2013
Messages: 552

• [Cryptography] TLS2   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] TLS2   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] TLS2   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] TLS2   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] TLS2   ianG
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Kristian Gjøsteen
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Manuel Pégourié-Gonnard
• [Cryptography] TLS2   ianG
  • [Cryptography] TLS2   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] Passwords   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] TLS2   ianG
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Christoph Anton Mitterer
    • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   ianG
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] Sha3   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Sha3   Christoph Anton Mitterer
  • [Cryptography] Sha3   David Johnston
    • [Cryptography] Sha3 and selecting algorithms for speed   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] System level security in "low end" environments   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] System level security in "low end" environments   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Sha3   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Sha3   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   Christoph Anton Mitterer
      • [Cryptography] Sha3   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] Sha3   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Sha3   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Sha3   Dan Kaminsky
    • [Cryptography] Sha3   Peter Fairbrother
• [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Adam Back
  • [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   ianG
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   dan at geer.org
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   ianG
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Lodewijk andré de la porte
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ised   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   ianG
• [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   dan at geer.org
• [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Nick
    • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Lodewijk andré de la porte
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Eitan Adler
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Kent Borg
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Benjamin Kreuter
    • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Kelly John Rose
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Benjamin Kreuter
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Joshua Marpet
    • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Russ Nelson
    • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Sha3   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom   Isaac Bickerstaff
  • [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Linux /dev/random and /dev/urandom   Gary Mulder
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   leichter at lrw.com
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Faré
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   ianG
• [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
  • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
    • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
      • [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Passwords   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Markus Wanner
• [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   John Lowry
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Paul Crowley
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Kristian Gjøsteen
• [Cryptography] Why is emailing me my password?   Greg
• [Cryptography] [nicolasc at cmu.edu: [fc-announce] Financial Cryptography 2014 Call for Papers]   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Alan Braggins
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Iran and murder   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Iran and murder   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Iran and murder   Tim Newsham
      • [Cryptography] RSA-210 factored   RTF
• [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Performance vs security   John Kelsey
• [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] [tor-talk] Guardian Tor article   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Sha3   David Johnston
• [Cryptography] A stealth redo on TLS with new encoding   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Sha3   radix42 at gmail.com
• [Cryptography] Sha3   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
• [Cryptography] P=NP on TV   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] P=NP on TV   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] P=NP on TV   David Johnston
    • [Cryptography] P=NP on TV   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Bill Stewart
• [Cryptography] Universal security measures for crypto primitives   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Universal security measures for crypto primitives   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Universal security measures for crypto primitives   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Lay András
  • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Dominik Schürmann
  • [Cryptography] Elliptic curve question   Hanno Böck
• [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Arnold Reinhold
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Arnold Reinhold
      • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Nico Williams
  • [Cryptography] AES-256- More NIST-y? paranoia   Grégory Alvarez
• [Cryptography] Politics - probably off topic here.   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Sha3   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Always a weakest link   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] The cost of National Security Letters   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   John Gilmore
    • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Paul Hoffman
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   jd.cypherpunks at gmail.com
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Tony Naggs
    • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Glenn Willen
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   ianG
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Eugen Leitl
    • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Tony Naggs
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Joe Abley
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Jeremy Stanley
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Joshua Marpet
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   The Doctor
      • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Peter Saint-Andre
    • [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Iran and murder   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Iran and murder   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Reminders and No General Political Discussion please   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] was this FIPS 186-1 (first DSA) an attemped NSA backdoor?   Adam Back
• [Cryptography] Iran and murder   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Iran and murder   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] ADMIN: Re: Iran and murder   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   R. Hirschfeld
  • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   lists at notatla.org.uk
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Nicolas Rachinsky
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Lars Luthman
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Broken RNG renders gov't-issued smartcards easily hackable.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Broken RNG renders gov't-issued smartcards easily hackable.   Wouter Slegers
      • [Cryptography] Broken RNG renders gov't-issued smartcards easily hackable.   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Broken RNG renders gov't-issued smartcards easily hackable.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Moritz Bartl
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   rex
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   d.nix
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Benjamin Kreuter
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Smári McCarthy
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   arxlight
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   R. Hirschfeld
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Nico Williams
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   R. Hirschfeld
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Charles Allhands
      • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Tom Ritter
  • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   d.nix
    • [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Erik de Castro Lopo
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Trevor Perrin
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Zooko O'Whielacronx
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Trevor Perrin
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Other Backdoors?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Other Backdoors?   David Mercer
• [Cryptography] SSH small RSA public exponent   Tim Hudson
  • [Cryptography] SSH small RSA public exponent   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] Crypto Standards v.s. Engineering habits - Was: NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] Key stretching   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Key stretching   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Key stretching   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Key stretching   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Key stretching   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Key stretching   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Key stretching   William Allen Simpson
• [Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case   Joe St Sauver
• [Cryptography] Plug for crypto.stackexchange.com   David Wagner
• [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   dj at deadhat.com
    • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Dan McDonald
    • [Cryptography] "/dev/random is not robust"   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] "/dev/random is not robust"   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Dave Howe
    • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Kelly John Rose
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Michael Kirk
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Nicholas Vanderweit
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Moritz Bartl
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Eugen Leitl
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   ianG
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] funding Tor development   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] funding Tor development   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Derrell Piper
  • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Sandy Harris
    • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Yaron Sheffer
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Alon Ziv
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   Lodewijk andré de la porte
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   Stephan Mueller
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random has issues   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random has issues   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random has issues   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random has issues   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] OpenSSL not using /dev/random (was: Re: /dev/random is not robust)   Patrick Pelletier
      • [Cryptography] OpenSSL not using /dev/random (was: Re: /dev/random is not robust)   Sandy Harris
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Alex Elsayed
      • [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Stephan Neuhaus
• [Cryptography] Encoding Key Identifiers in email addresses   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Encoding Key Identifiers in email addresses   David Mercer
• [Cryptography] my comment to NIST about reducing capacity in SHA-3   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
• [Cryptography] Trust model for PRISM Hardening Email   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Cryptographer Adi Shamir Prevented from Attending NSA History Conference   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] Encoding Key Identifiers in email addresses   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] PRISM-Proof Email, Key Management and Publication Specification   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] /dev/random has issues   Stephan Mueller
• [Cryptography] please dont weaken pre-image resistance of SHA3 (Re: NIST about to weaken SHA3?)   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] funding Tor development   L Jean Camp
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Christoph Anton Mitterer
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Sandy Harris
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Russ Nelson
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Sandy Harris
      • [Cryptography] PRNG WYTM   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Christoph Anton Mitterer
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] NIST should publish Suite A   ianG
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Russ Nelson
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Russ Nelson
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Christoph Anton Mitterer
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Tony Naggs
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Philipp Gühring
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Philipp Gühring
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   David Mercer
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Sandy Harris
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Gilmore
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Gary Wuertz
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Christoph Anton Mitterer
• [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Christian Huitema
    • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Devin Reade
    • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Michael Kjörling
      • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Michael Kjörling
    • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Devin Reade
  • [Cryptography] Mail Lists In the Post-Snowden Era   Joe Abley
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] funding Tor development   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Eitan Adler
      • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Pat Farrell
  • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   ianG
    • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] "Death Note" elimination for hashes   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful   Viktor Dukhovni
  • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Ruben Pollan
    • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Tom Ritter
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Scott G. Kelly
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   John Ioannidis
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Glenn Willen
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers (was: Hasty PRISM proofing considered harmful)   Sebastian Krahmer
• [Cryptography] Fwd: [capsicum] capsicum-linux codebase   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] A different explanation of the Snowden documents   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] A different explanation of the Snowden documents   Mark Seiden
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Reminders for List   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] not crypto, but related to recent discussions and of possible interest to list members in the Boston area   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Russ Nelson
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Peter Saint-Andre
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] /dev/random is not robust   Stephan Mueller
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Sandy Harris
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Sandy Harris
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   David Johnston
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   ianG
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   ianG
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   ianG
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] FIPS 140 testing hurting secure random bit generation   Paul Hoffman
      • [Cryptography] FIPS 140 testing hurting secure random bit generation   Stephan Mueller
      • [Cryptography] FIPS 140 testing hurting secure random bit generation   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] FIPS 140 testing hurting secure random bit generation   Paul Hoffman
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Theodore Ts'o
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   tytso at mit.edu
• [Cryptography] BitMessage?   Russ Nelson
  • [Cryptography] BitMessage?   Keyfur
    • [Cryptography] BitMessage?   Faré
  • [Cryptography] BitMessage   Russ Nelson
    • [Cryptography] BitMessage   d.nix
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Theodore Ts'o
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] DSL modems - how would we detect wholesale subversion?   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption   Felix Ruzzoli
      • [Cryptography] DSL modems - how would we detect wholesale subversion?   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] DSL modems - how would we detect wholesale subversion?   Dan White
      • [Cryptography] DSL modems - how would we detect wholesale subversion?   Bill Stewart
• [Cryptography] programable computers inside our computers   =JeffH
• [Cryptography] mailinator?   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] mailinator?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] provisioning a seed for /dev/urandom   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Stephan Mueller
• [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Sandy Harris
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Stephan Mueller
• [Cryptography] [zfs] [Review] 4185 New hash algorithm support   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
• [Cryptography] Randomness from network hardware?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Randomness from network hardware?   David Mercer
  • [Cryptography] Randomness from network hardware?   Bill Stewart
• [Cryptography] My comments regarding using CPU jitter for random number generation   tytso at mit.edu
  • [Cryptography] My comments regarding using CPU jitter for random number generation   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] My comments regarding using CPU jitter for random number generation   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] My comments regarding using CPU jitter for random number generation   Stephan Mueller
• [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   Ralph Holz
  • [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Standard exponents in RSA   Ralph Holz
• [Cryptography] Fwd: [New post] Announcing The Dark Mail Alliance – Founded by Silent Circle & Lavabit   Richard Outerbridge
• [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Sandy Harris
  • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] [RNG] /dev/random initialisation   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] [RNG] on RNGs, VM state, rollback, etc.   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   David Mercer
    • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Joe Abley
  • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Hannes Frederic Sowa
    • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] PGP Key Signing parties (Trust Link Grid)   Ralf Senderek
• [Cryptography] What's a Plausible Attack On Random Number Generation?   Jerry Leichter

Last message date: Thu Oct 31 22:22:17 EDT 2013
Archived on: Thu Oct 31 23:46:44 EDT 2013

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