[Cryptography] BitMessage?

[Faré]

On Mon, Oct 28, 2013 at 12:31 AM, Keyfur <james at keyfur.com> wrote:
> That would get extremely bulky in mass-adoption, in both local storage and
> network usage. Currently they have some structure to create tiered
> "streams", but that still doesn't eliminate the excessive network burden, it
> just saves some disk space.
>
Indeed. Proof of work is supposed to alleviate these issues, but can
only do so much.

> Proof-of-work doesn't protect broadcast message abuse, because an attacker
> could just use a small botnet to generate a bunch of untransmitted messages
> with similar timestamps for a future date. Once that date arrives, then the
> attacker could just submit a very large batch of valid broadcast
> bitmessages.
>
This can be fixed, if it hasn't been yet: your proof of work needs to
incorporate recent bitmessage chain state in its salt, so you can't
precompute long in advance.

> otherwise think Bitmessage is a great idea. It's current, humbly sized
> userbase makes for comfortable testing.
>
> https://bitmessage.org/bitmessage.pdf
>
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