[Cryptography] Broken RNG renders gov't-issued smartcards easily hackable.

[Ray Dillinger]

On 10/11/2013 11:23 AM, Wouter Slegers wrote:
> Dear Ray,
> 
> On 2013-10-11, at 19:38 , Ray Dillinger <bear at sonic.net> wrote:
>> This is despite meeting (for some inscrutable definition of "meeting")
>> FIPS 140-2 Level 2 and Common Criteria standards.  These standards
>> require steps that were clearly not done here.  Yet, validation
>> certificates were issued.

> This is a misunderstanding of the CC certification and FIPS validation processes:

> the certificates were issued *under the condition* that the software/system 
> built on it uses/implements the RNG tests mandated. The software didn't, 
> invalidating the results of the certifications.

Either way, it boils down to "tests were supposed to be done or conditions
were supposed to be met, and producing the darn cards with those certifications
asserted amounts to stating outright that they were, and yet they were not."

All you're saying here is that the certifying agencies are not the ones
stating outright that the tests were done.  I can accept that, but it does
not change the situation or result, except perhaps in terms of the placement
of blame. I *still* hope they bill the people responsible for doing the tests
on the first generation of cards for the cost of their replacement.

				Bear