[Cryptography] prism-proof email in the degenerate case

[Nicolas Rachinsky]

* John Denker <jsd at av8n.com> [2013-10-10 17:13 -0700]:
> *) Each server should publish a public key for "/dev/null" so that
>  users can send cover traffic upstream to the server, without
>  worrying that it might waste downstream bandwidth.
> 
>  This is crucial for deniabililty:  If the rubber-hose guy accuses
>  me of replying to ABC during the XYZ crisis, I can just shrug and 
>  say it was cover traffic.

If the server deletes cover traffic, the nsa just needs to subscribe.
Then the messages which you sent but which were not delivered via the
list are cover traffic.

Nicolas

-- 
http://www.rachinsky.de/nicolas