[Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized

Anne & Lynn Wheeler lynn at garlic.com
Wed Oct 2 07:34:10 EDT 2013


On 09/30/13 04:41, ianG wrote:
> Experience suggests that asking a standards committee to do the encoding format is a disaster.
>
> I just looked at my code, which does something we call Wire, and it's 700 loc.  Testing code is about a kloc I suppose.  Writing reference implementations is a piece of cake.
>
> Why can't we just designate some big player to do it, and follow suit? Why argue in committee?


early 90s annual ACM SIGMODS (DBMS) conference in San Jose ... general meeting in (full) ballroom ... somebody in the audience asks panel on the stage what is all this x.5xx stuff about ... and one of the panelists replies that it is a bunch of networking engineers trying to re-invent 1960s DBMS technology.

CA industry is pitching $20B/annum business case on wallstreet ... where the financial industry pays CAs $100/annum for every account for a relying-party-only digital certificate ... where the financial industry providing all the information that goes into the certificate (CA industry just reformats all the information and digitally signs it). In one case of institution with 14M accounts, the board asks what is this $1.4B/annum thing about?

I repeatedly point out that it is redundant and superfluous since the institution already has all the information. Purpose of the certificate is to append to every financial transaction. I also point out that digital certificate payload is enormous bloat, 100 times larger than the transaction size its attached to (besides redundant and superfluous)

CA industry then sponsors x9.63 work in X9 financial standards industry for "compressed certificate" format ... possibly getting the payload bloat down to 10 times (instead of hundred times). Part of the compressed certificate work was to eliminate fields that the relying party already had. Since I had already shown that the relying party (institution) already had all fields, it was possible to compress every certificate to zero bytes ... so rather than doing digitally signed transactions w/o certificates ... it was possible to do digitally signed transactions with mandated appended zero-byte certificates.

Trivia: last few years before he passed, Postel would let me do part of STD1. There was a joke that while IETF required at least two interoperable implementations before standards progression, ISO didn't even require that a standard be implementable.

-- 
virtualization experience starting Jan1968, online at home since Mar1970


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