[Cryptography] [cryptography] are ECDSA curves provably not cooked? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)

[Tony Arcieri]

On Tue, Oct 1, 2013 at 12:00 PM, Jeffrey Goldberg <jeffrey at goldmark.org>wrote:

> If the NSA had the capability to pick weak curves while covering their
> tracks in such a way, why wouldn’t they have pulled the same trick with
> Dual_EC_DRBG?
>

<tinfoilhat>They wanted us to think they were incompetent, so we would
expect that Dual_EC_DRBG was their failed attempt to tamper with a
cryptographic standard, and so we would overlook the more sinister and
subtle attempts to tamper with the NIST curves</tinfoilhat>

-- 
Tony Arcieri
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