September 2013 Archives by thread

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Starting: Sun Sep 1 07:11:06 EDT 2013
Ending: Mon Sep 30 23:50:10 EDT 2013
Messages: 891

• [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Andy Steingruebl
      • [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Paul Hoffman
      • [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Andy Steingruebl
      • [Cryptography] Google's Public Key Size (was Re: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] NSA hates sunshine   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jack Lloyd
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Popular curves (was: NSA and cryptanalysis)   ianG
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Joachim Strömbergson
  • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Faré
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Faré
• [Cryptography] Functional specification for email client?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Backup is completely separate   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Backup is completely separate   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   radix42 at gmail.com
  • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Alexander Klimov
  • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] A strategy to circumvent patents?   Faré
  • [Cryptography] A strategy to circumvent patents?   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   radix42 at gmail.com
  • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Richard Salz
    • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Faré
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Faré
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions)   Stephan Neuhaus
      • [Cryptography] Hashes into Ciphers (was Re: FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions)   Joachim Strömbergson
  • [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR.   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR.   radix42 at gmail.com
      • [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   radix42 at gmail.com
  • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Richard Salz
  • [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   james hughes
• [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   radix42 at gmail.com
• [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Lucky Green
    • [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Taral
      • [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Lucky Green
      • [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Taral
      • [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Jeremy Stanley
• [Cryptography] Popular curves (was: NSA and cryptanalysis)   Jose Luis Gomez Pardo
• [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions   Faré
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Jeremy Stanley
• [Cryptography] NY Times: "NSA Foils Much Internet Encryption"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] The Guardian: "US and UK spy agencies defeat privacy and security on the internet"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eric Murray
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eric Murray
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Tim Dierks
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Kristian Gjøsteen
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Tim Dierks
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Derrell Piper
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eugen Leitl
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Derrell Piper
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jeffrey I. Schiller
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Bernie Cosell
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eric Murray
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   Charles Jackson
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto? (was: BULLRUN)   Richard Clayton
      • [Cryptography] tamper-evident crypto?   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Bill Squier
      • [Cryptography] Aside on random numbers (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] ADMIN: less Snowden, more Crypto   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Samuel Weiler
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Joe Abley
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Joe Abley
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Chris Palmer
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   David Mercer
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Paul Wouters
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Daniel Cegiełka
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Market demands for security (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Bowen
      • [Cryptography] Why are some protocols hard to deploy? (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Why are some protocols hard to deploy? (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   David Mercer
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   arxlight
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Lance James
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Can you backdoor a symmetric cipher   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Symmetric cipher + Backdoor = Public Key System   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Symmetric cipher + Backdoor = Public Key System   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Impossible trapdoor systems (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] Sabotaged hardware (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Please, please, please don't top post.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier in The Guardian on BULLRUN etc.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious?   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious?   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] IA side subverted by SIGINT side   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] Is ECC suspicious?   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Jeremy Stanley
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Dan McDonald
  • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ralph Holz
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ralph Holz
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Jack Lloyd
      • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware (Re: Suite B after today's news)   Thor Lancelot Simon
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] NSA and cryptanalysis   ianG
• [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Jon Callas
  • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption   james hughes
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Peter Saint-Andre
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy   Guido Witmond
      • [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy   Eugen Leitl
      • [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] one time pads   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Security is a total system problem (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
      • [Cryptography] Perfection versus Forward Secrecy   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Quantum Computers for Shor's Algorithm (was Re: Perfection versus Forward Secrecy)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Paul Crowley
• [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jaap-Henk Hoepman
  • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Marcus D. Leech
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Derrell Piper
      • [Cryptography] Replacing CAs (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jaap-Henk Hoepman
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jaap-Henk Hoepman
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Naif M. Otaibi
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Jim Popovitch
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Protecting Private Keys   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] ElGamal, DSA randomness (was Re: Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?)   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   zooko
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Lodewijk andré de la porte
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jaap-Henk Hoepman
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Andrea Shepard
• [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Raphaël Jacquot
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Ralph Holz
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   zooko
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   The Doctor
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Chris Palmer
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   The Doctor
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   The Doctor
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Daniel Veditz
    • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   ianG
      • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS (was Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: N.S.A. Foils Much Internet Encryption)   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• [Cryptography] Sabotaged hardware (was Re: Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN")   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   James Cloos
    • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Marcus D. Leech
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Marcus D. Leech
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Peter Saint-Andre
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Walter van Holst
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite   ianG
      • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] The One True Cipher Suite   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] ADMIN: Ending thread "The One True Cipher Suite"   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
  • [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   ianG
• [Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Matthew Green on BULLRUN: briefly censored   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Eugen Leitl
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Lodewijk andré de la porte
  • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Harald Koch
  • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Chris Palmer
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   The Doctor
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Chris Palmer
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Bill Stewart
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Gregory Perry
      • [Cryptography] Does NSA break in to endpoints (was Re: Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Does NSA break in to endpoints (was Re: Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked)   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Dan McDonald
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   Gregory Perry
    • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier has gotten seriously spooked   james hughes
• [Cryptography] 1024 bit DH still common in Tor network   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Bruce Schneier calls for independent prosecutor to investigate NSA   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Marcus D. Leech
    • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Thor Lancelot Simon
      • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Eugen Leitl
    • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] Washington Post: Google racing to encrypt links between data centers   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Reminder, yet again...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] NYTimes: Legislation Seeks to Bar N.S.A. Tactic in Encryption   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Using Raspberry Pis   Marcus D. Leech
• [Cryptography] I have to whistle to blow...   Dan McDonald
• [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Carl Ellison
    • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   Florian Weimer
    • [Cryptography] XORing plaintext with ciphertext   John Kelsey
• [Cryptography] [liberationtech] Random number generation being influenced - rumors   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor?   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] How to get really paranoid   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] New task for the NSA   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Volume, top posting, trimming, SUBJECT LINES   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Christian Huitema
  • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Peter Saint-Andre
    • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Jeffrey I. Schiller
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Why prefer symmetric crypto over public key crypto?   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] djb's McBits (with Tung Chaou and Peter Schwabe)   ianG
• [Cryptography] Speaking of EDH (GnuTLS interoperability)   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Tim Newsham
  • [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Tim Newsham
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ralph Holz
  • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   David Johnston
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Owen Shepherd
    • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] Random number generation influenced, HW RNG   Eric Young
• [Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key   Faré
  • [Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key   ianG
• [Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor?   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [tor-talk] NIST approved crypto in Tor?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] A Likely Story!   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] A Likely Story!   Alexander Klimov
    • [Cryptography] A Likely Story!   Peter Fairbrother
• [Cryptography] Trapdoor symmetric key   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Points of compromise   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Points of compromise   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Points of compromise   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Thor Lancelot Simon
    • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] auditing a hardware RNG   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Techniques for malevolent crypto hardware   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Andreas Davour
• [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Nap van Zuuren
  • [Cryptography] Der Spiegel: "NSA Can Spy on Smart Phone Data"   Tony Naggs
• [Cryptography] AES state of the art...   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] AES state of the art...   Alexander Klimov
    • [Cryptography] AES state of the art...   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] AES state of the art...   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Paper on Tor deanonymization: "Users Get Routed"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] "Is DNSSEC is really the right solution?" [djb video]   Paul Wouters
• [Cryptography] In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help   james hughes
• [Cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Kristian Gjøsteen
• [Cryptography] IETF: Security and Pervasive Monitoring   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] Usage models (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Alexander Klimov
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] [cryptography] SSH uses secp256/384r1 which has the same parameters as what's in SEC2 which are the same the parameters as specified in SP800-90 for Dual EC DRBG!   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Guido Witmond
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle   Paul Crowley
      • [Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] Squaring Zooko's triangle   Guido Witmond
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Guido Witmond
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Peter Fairbrother
• [Cryptography] Scott Aaaronson: NSA: Possibly breaking US laws, but still bound by laws of computational complexity   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Phil Pennock
    • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Yaron Sheffer
  • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   james hughes
  • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Stephen Farrell
  • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Alan Braggins
      • [Cryptography] What TLS ciphersuites are still OK?   Yaron Sheffer
• [Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves   Nemo
  • [Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves   Joachim Strömbergson
      • [Cryptography] Seed values for NIST curves   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: traffic levels   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: differing subscription and sender addresses   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Some protection against replay attacks   Faré
• [Cryptography] Opening Discussion: Speculation on "BULLRUN"   Andreas Davour
• [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Suite B after today's news   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] Fw: how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] how could ECC params be subverted & other evidence   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Marcus D. Leech
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Rob Kendrick
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Marcus D. Leech
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Sandy Harris
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Thor Lancelot Simon
    • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Marcus D. Leech
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Bill Stewart
• [Cryptography] Reports: NSA, GCHQ used forged certs to impersonate Google   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] [TLS] New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt   james hughes
• [Cryptography] Time for djb's Edwards curves in TLS?   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Nemo
  • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Nemo
  • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Raphael Jacquot
    • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] People should turn on PFS in TLS   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
    • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   Adam Langley
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
    • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   Adam Langley
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   Adam Langley
      • [Cryptography] Evaluating draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305   William Allen Simpson
• [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Guido Witmond
  • [Cryptography] Thoughts about keys   Eugen Leitl
    • [Cryptography] Introducing strangers. Was: Thoughts about keys   Guido Witmond
      • [Cryptography] Introducing strangers. Was: Thoughts about keys   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] soft chewy center   bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
  • [Cryptography] soft chewy center   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] soft chewy center   bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
• [Cryptography] EFF press release on latest FISA opinions release   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Nemo
    • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Availability of plaintext/ciphertext pairs (was Re: In the face of "cooperative" end-points, PFS doesn't help)   Nemo
• [Cryptography] History and implementation status of Opportunistic Encryption for IPsec   Paul Wouters
• [Cryptography] Laws and cryptography   Grégory Alvarez
  • [Cryptography] Laws and cryptography   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] SPDZ, a practical protocol for Multi-Party Computation   Max Kington
• [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Andrew W. Donoho
  • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Tim Dierks
      • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Andrew W. Donoho
      • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] About those fingerprints ...   Ramsey Dow
• [Cryptography] NIST reopens RNG public comment period   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] Defenses against pervasive versus targeted intercept   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Please pick appropriate Subject lines...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis   Bernie Cosell
  • [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis   Andrew Righter
  • [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis   Max Kington
  • [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis   Jonathan Katz
• [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Nemo
    • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Nico Williams
      • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Summary of the discussion so far   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] Credit for Trusting Trust   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Credit for Trusting Trust   Jonathan Thornburg
• [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Thor Lancelot Simon
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   ianG
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Sandy Harris
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Bill Stewart
    • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Marcus D. Leech
      • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard   Marcus Leech
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Chris Kuethe
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Dan Veeneman
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Eugen Leitl
    • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Yaron Sheffer
      • [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Killing two IV related birds with one stone   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] NIST announcement about Dual_EC_DRBG   John Kemp
• [Cryptography] Books on modern cryptanalysis   Jose Luis Gomez Pardo
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan   Paul Wouters
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan   Nico Williams
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] very little is missing for working BTNS in Openswan   Taral
• [Cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans   Eugen Leitl
  • [Cryptography] Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Finding Entropy Isn't That Hard   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] Other curves and algos used in France   Erwann ABALEA
• [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] Key management, key storage. (was Re: prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Key management, key storage. (was Re: prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity)   Trevor Perrin
  • [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   Adam Back
    • [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] prism proof email, namespaces, and anonymity   StealthMonger
• [Cryptography] Thoughts on hardware randomness sources   Marcus D. Leech
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Paul Hoffman
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Patrick Pelletier
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Kelly John Rose
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   arxlight
      • [Cryptography] check-summed keys in secret ciphers?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Lodewijk andré de la porte
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Fairbrother
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Ralph Holz
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   David Kuehling
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   ianG
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Tero Kivinen
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Lucky Green
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Joachim Strömbergson
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review"   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review"   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] A lot to learn from "Business Records FISA NSA Review"   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] real random numbers   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Joachim Strömbergson
• [Cryptography] real random numbers   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] real random numbers   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: entropy of randomness discussion is falling...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Broken RNG Generating Taiwanese Citizen Digital Certificates   Kent Borg
• [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Dan McDonald
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   ianG
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Stephan Neuhaus
    • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   ianG
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   Sandy Harris
    • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] The paranoid approach to crypto-plumbing   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Kristian Gjøsteen
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   ianG
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Mark Atwood
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Mark Atwood
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Alan Braggins
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   ianG
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] RSA recommends against use of its own products.   ianG
• [Cryptography] Apple and Certificate Pinning   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] End to end   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] End to end   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] End to end   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] End to end   Christoph Gruber
    • [Cryptography] End to end   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] End to end   Christoph Gruber
      • [Cryptography] End to end   Max Kington
• [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] MITM source patching [was Schneier got spooked]   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis]   Tim Newsham
  • [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis]   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis]   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] AES [was NSA and cryptanalysis]   William Muriithi
• [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Radioactive random numbers   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] paranoid cryptoplumbing is a probably not defending the weakest point   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Ivan Ristić blog post on TLS best practices   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Ars Technica on the Taiwanese National ID smart card break   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   John Kemp
    • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Albert Lunde
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Max Kington
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   ianG
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   d.nix
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Russell Nelson
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Robin Alden
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Carl Wallace
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   ianG
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   John Kemp
      • [Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening   ianG
• [Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Johns Hopkins round table on NSA and Crypto   Jens Kubieziel
• [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   ianG
    • [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Walter van Holst
    • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Kent Borg
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Kelly John Rose
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Eugen Leitl
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   ianG
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   Adam Back
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   ianG
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   dan at geer.org
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] TLS2   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Gilmore response to NSA mathematician's "make rules for NSA" appeal   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] FISA court releases its "Primary Order" re telephone metadata   Alfie John
• [Cryptography] Some (limited) info about Apple A7 security for fingerprints, keychains   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] An NSA mathematician shares his from-the-trenches view of the agency's surveillance activities   Pat Farrell
• [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification   Derek Jones
  • [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification   Tim Newsham
• [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
    • [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Cryptographic mailto: URI   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
• [Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Specification: Prism Proof Email   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification   Tim Newsham
  • [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification   Derek Jones
• [Cryptography] InfoRequest: How to configure email clients to accept encrypted S/MIME   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation   d.nix
  • [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation   d.nix
  • [Cryptography] What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Nico Williams
  • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Alan Braggins
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: What is Intel® Core™ vPro™ Technology Animation   d.nix
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Hardware Trojan Protection   Lodewijk andré de la porte
• [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Gerardus Hendricks
  • [Cryptography] The hypothetical random number generator backdoor   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] heterotic authority + web-of-trust + pinning   John Denker
• [Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Adam Back
  • [Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] forward-secrecy >=2048-bit in legacy browser/servers? (Re: RSA equivalent key length/strength)   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] psyops   David Honig
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] Asynchronous forward secrecy encryption   Eugen Leitl
• [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   Taral
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   David Kuehling
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   John Kelsey
    • [Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Christoph Anton Mitterer
  • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Watson Ladd
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   Christoph Anton Mitterer
• [Cryptography] TLS2   Adam Back
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] TLS2   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] TLS2   Hanno Böck
  • [Cryptography] TLS2   Philipp Gühring
• [Cryptography] three crypto lists - why and which   Adam Back
• [Cryptography] Sha3   John Kelsey
  • [Cryptography] Sha3   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] NIST about to weaken SHA3?   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] encoding formats should not be committee'ized   Mark Atwood

Last message date: Mon Sep 30 23:50:10 EDT 2013
Archived on: Tue Oct 1 12:04:49 EDT 2013

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