[Cryptography] RSA equivalent key length/strength

[David Kuehling]

>>>>> "Patrick" == Patrick Pelletier <code at funwithsoftware.org> writes:

> On 9/14/13 11:38 AM, Adam Back wrote:

>> Tin foil or not: maybe its time for 3072 RSA/DH and 384/512 ECC?

> I'm inclined to agree with you, but you might be interested/horrified
> in the "1024 bits is enough for anyone" debate currently unfolding on
> the TLS list:

> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg10009.html

I'm even more horrified, that the Apache webserver uses 1024-bit Diffie
Hellman exchange for TLS/SSL with no way to increase group size other
than modifying and recompiling the sources.  Now that everybody calls
for website operators to enable perfect-forward secrecy, we may in fact
see an overall security downgrade.

  http://grokbase.com/t/apache/dev/1393kx4qn8/
  http://blog.ivanristic.com/2013/08/increasing-dhe-strength-on-apache.html

(Of course you can also get PFS via ECDHE, but many production webserver
installations run older openssl versions that only support DHE)

David
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