[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening

[Robin Alden]

> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:47:17PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
> > > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
> > > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
> > > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
> > >
> > > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
> >
> > X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
> > don't work.

Which is why the CAB Forum and Mozilla made the pragmatic move to promote
the use of X.509 name constraints as a non-critical extension.

> 
> And public CAs don't generally sell intermediate CAs with name
constraints.
> Rather undercuts their business model.
> 

Public CAs are starting to offer name-constrained intermediate CAs to
suitable customers.
Why wouldn't we? - It doesn't undercut our business model any more than
selling a wildcard certificate.

> --
> 	Viktor.

Robin Alden
Comodo