[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
robin.alden at comodogroup.com
Wed Sep 18 20:03:44 EDT 2013
> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:47:17PM +0000, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
> > > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
> > > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
> > > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
> > > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
> > >
> > > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
> > X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
> > don't work.
Which is why the CAB Forum and Mozilla made the pragmatic move to promote
the use of X.509 name constraints as a non-critical extension.
> And public CAs don't generally sell intermediate CAs with name
> Rather undercuts their business model.
Public CAs are starting to offer name-constrained intermediate CAs to
Why wouldn't we? - It doesn't undercut our business model any more than
selling a wildcard certificate.
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