[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening
ben at links.org
Wed Sep 18 15:04:04 EDT 2013
On 18 September 2013 15:30, Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography at dukhovni.org>wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 11:48:40PM -0700, Christian Huitema wrote:
> > > Given that many real organizations have hundreds of front end
> > > machines sharing RSA private keys, theft of RSA keys may very well be
> > > much easier in many cases than broader forms of sabotage.
> > Or we could make it easy to have one separate RSA key per front end,
> > using the main RSA key of the organization.
> This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
> and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
> DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
> with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
> For HTTPS, there is little indication yet that any of the major
> browsers are likely to implement DANE support in the near future.
> The cryptography mailing list
> cryptography at metzdowd.com
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