[Cryptography] PRISM-Proofing and PRISM-Hardening

[Ben Laurie]

On 18 September 2013 21:47, Viktor Dukhovni <cryptography at dukhovni.org>wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 08:04:04PM +0100, Ben Laurie wrote:
>
> > > This is only realistic with DANE TLSA (certificate usage 2 or 3),
> > > and thus will start to be realistic for SMTP next year (provided
> > > DNSSEC gets off the ground) with the release of Postfix 2.11, and
> > > with luck also a DANE-capable Exim release.
> >
> > What's wrong with name-constrained intermediates?
>
> X.509 name constraints (critical extensions in general) typically
> don't work.
>

No. They typically work. As usual, Apple are the fly in the ointment.
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