[Cryptography] real random numbers

John Denker jsd at av8n.com
Sun Sep 15 09:06:44 EDT 2013

On 09/15/2013 03:49 AM, Kent Borg wrote:

> When Bruce Schneier last put his hand to designing an RNG he
> concluded that estimating entropy is doomed. I don't think he would
> object to some coarse order-of-magnitude confirmation that there is
> entropy coming in, but I think trying to meter entropy-in against
> entropy-out will either leave you starved or fooled.

That's just completely backwards.  In the world I live in,
people get fooled because they /didn't/ do the analysis, not
because they did.

I very much doubt that Bruce concluded that accounting is "doomed".
If he did, it would mark a dramatic step backwards from his work 
on the commendable and influential Yarrow PRNG:
  J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, and N. Ferguson (1999)

This revolves around a /two-stage/ design.  Entropy accumulates
in the first stage and is then transferred in /batches/ to the
second stage.  There must be a substantial amount of energy in
each batch, or the entire batch is wasted, in the sense that it
does not help the PRNG recover from compromise.  Let's be clear:
transferring "randomness" to the second stage before the accumulator
has accumulated enough entropy is demonstrably worse than nothing.
It wastes entropy that otherwise would have eventually accumulated
to a useful level.

This design makes sense if *and only if* you have a reliable 
non-zero lower bound on the entropy coming into the first stage.

A PRNG is like almost everything else in cryptography:  You 
can't build a good PRNG unless you know how to /attack/ a PRNG.
Dribbling small amounts of entropy into the final-stage pool
does *not* have acceptable resistance to attack.  Naïve
intuition suggests it might be OK, but it's not.

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