March 2016 Archives by thread

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Starting: Tue Mar 1 04:53:36 EST 2016
Ending: Thu Mar 31 18:46:00 EDT 2016
Messages: 514

• [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   danimoth
  • [Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone   John Levine
• [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help   james hughes
• [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Salz, Rich
    • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   ianG
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Chertoff Group's new 28-page report on Encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Whit Diffie and Martin Hellman win ACM Turing Award   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   Yui Hirasawa
    • [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   John Gilmore
    • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Google releases new hash function implementations   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   David Johnston
      • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Quantum cryptography for book entry transaction settlement?   Robert Hettinga
• [Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices   Gé Weijers
• [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   James S. Tyre
    • [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs   James S. Tyre
• [Cryptography] More Apple news   Viktor Dukhovni
  • [Cryptography] More Apple news   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] More Apple news   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] More Apple news   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] More Apple news   Arnold Reinhold
    • [Cryptography] More Apple news   Allen
• [Cryptography] USG v. Apple - Amici Applications Through 3 March 2016   John Young
• [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
    • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   ianG
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] is this feudalism?   J.M. Porup
      • [Cryptography] is this feudalism?   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] is this feudalism?   J.M. Porup
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   James S. Tyre
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Allen
      • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John Young
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   John Young
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Possibility of a quick solution of security of communications of the common people?   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   John Young
    • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Ladar Levison
      • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Ladar Levison
      • [Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] What is Apple's public signing key?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] What is Apple's public signing key?   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help"   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help"   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help"   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help"   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Bloomberg: "Amazon to Restore Encryption on Fire Devices After Cutting Back"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Susan Landau's written testimony before the House Judiciary Committee   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Susan Landau's written testimony before the House Judiciary Committee   =JeffH
• [Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] The rewards of frenzied comsec-shopping should be a pardon for Snowden   John Young
• [Cryptography] NYT: "Competing Interests on Encryption Divide Top Obama Officials"   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Official (?) govt crypto characters   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Jonathan Katz
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Cothority   J.M. Porup
      • [Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple")   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] Washington Post op ed by Apple's Craig Federighi   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Washington Post op ed by Apple's Craig Federighi   John Young
• [Cryptography] News flash: FBI in the "dark" about "numbers" radio stations   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] News flash: FBI in the "dark" about "numbers" radio stations   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Two questions of security   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Two questions of security   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Two questions of security   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/...   ianG
• [Cryptography] UK GCHQ finally declassifies Ellis papers on public key crypto   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT)   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT)   Jonathan Thornburg
    • [Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT)   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT)   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Apple's appeal brief re NY iPhone iOS7 5s   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple's appeal brief re NY iPhone iOS7 5s   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Michael Hayden supports Apple   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Ralf Senderek
      • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Matt Johnston
    • [Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] A possibility of good anonymous communications?   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] A possibility of good anonymous communications?   Yui Hirasawa
• [Cryptography] Decentralized cosigning: Apple can't sign on its own   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] USG Support of Motion to Compel Apple Decrypt, iPhone Forensics   John Young
• [Cryptography] Apple's suzerainty problem   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] When did Apple customers stop beating their wives?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] DoJ2Apple: Weak crypto req'd so strong crypto is visible   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] What if DoJ breaks Apple's chain-of-trust?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Apple Attorneys Move to Join CA and NY Cases   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Apple Attorneys Move to Join CA and NY Cases   John Young
• [Cryptography] DEcryption Contract ENforcement Tool (DECENT): A Practical Alternative to Government Decryption Backdoors   Peter Linder
• [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Howard Chu
    • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Yui Hirasawa
  • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Erik Granger
  • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
    • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Says   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Says   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Charlie Kaufman
  • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Allen
  • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Benjamin Kreuter
  • [Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron?   Jonathan Katz
• [Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Apple in EDNY added as interested party in another iPhone case in EDNY   John Young
• [Cryptography] "WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order"   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Apple Buys Ink by the Barrel?   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Richard Clarke interviewed on NPR's Morning Edition   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt   John Young
  • [Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Michael Chertoff uses 2nd Amendment arg for encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   rcs at xmission.com
  • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   J.M. Porup
    • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] ADMIN: Ad hominems are not acceptable.   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Ilya Levin
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   dan at geer.org
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems)   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] TLS 1.2 Long Term Support Profile Draft RFC   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] USG v. Lavabit-Snowden Files Unsealed   John Young
  • [Cryptography] USG v. Lavabit-Snowden Files Unsealed   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] ADMIN: No top posting, please.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   John Young
    • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   Ladar Levison
    • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code"   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code"   ianG
    • [Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code"   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code"   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code"   Ladar Levison
• [Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known?   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known?   david wong
    • [Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known?   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known?   david wong
• [Cryptography] Skipjack is dead.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Time Magazine on Apple vs. FBI   Arnold Reinhold
• [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Michael Kjörling
    • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Microsoft remote desktop updates   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Apple engineers risk ethics violations if they comply   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] USG-Apple - 3/22/16 Hearing Procedures, Add 3 USGs   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] USG-Apple - 3/22/16 Hearing Procedures, Add 3 USGs   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] Snowden's email unredacted in Lavabit dox   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Code beg... C#...   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Code beg... C#...   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Code beg... C#...   Dennis E. Hamilton
• [Cryptography] "Tea Consent" video for DoJ/FBI   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Motherboard article on Lavabit case   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Motherboard article on Lavabit case   Ladar Levison
• [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Max Kington
    • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Charles Jackson
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Christophe Petit on ECDLP future advances   Thierry Moreau
• [Cryptography] HohhaDynamicXOR is broken   Oscar
• [Cryptography] Q: Status quo of key exchange via neural syncronization   mok-kong shen
  • [Cryptography] Q: Status quo of key exchange via neural syncronization   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   dan at geer.org
  • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   dan at geer.org
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   J.M. Porup
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] [tor-talk] Traffic shaping attack   grarpamp
• [Cryptography] iMessage cryptography is broken   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet   Troy Benjegerdes
    • [Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   James S. Tyre
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone   John Young
• [Cryptography] USG-Apple Hearing Vacated, Decrypt Order Stayed   John Young
• [Cryptography] This is not the end...   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] This is not the end...   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] This is not the end...   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] This is not the end...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] And they're off...   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Allen
    • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] And they're off...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Mike Masnick (Techdirt) explains DoJ v. Apple   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] USG-Apple Oral Proceedings Transcript 21 March 2016   John Young
• [Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security   Adrian McCullagh
  • [Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security   Jack Liddy
• [Cryptography] e-mail giants / IETF   dan at geer.org
  • [Cryptography] e-mail giants / IETF   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata   J.M. Porup
• [Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report"   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report"   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] New IETF draft on proposed best practices -- feedback wanted   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Brian Gladman
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   ianG
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   ianG
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Nemo
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Andrew Donoho
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Jonathan Katz
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Aaron Zauner
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   ianG
  • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Thierry Moreau
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Watson Ladd
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   ianG
    • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   ianG
      • [Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] OTP phones - arrested for buying phones.   Peter Trei
  • [Cryptography] OTP phones - arrested for buying phones.   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] On simple and public cryptography   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   grarpamp
  • [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   ianG
      • [Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI)   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Smallest 4-bit S-box?   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   Jeff Burdges
    • [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems?   Jeff Burdges
• [Cryptography] MSFT's Win10, Chinese Edition   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   james hughes
    • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   ianG
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   dj at deadhat.com
  • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change?   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   John Young
  • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   John Young
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   james hughes
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Krisztián Pintér
  • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Tamzen Cannoy
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Alfie John
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Alfie John
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Jeff Burdges
    • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin   Lee Clagett
• [Cryptography] USG-Apple Orders to Assist Search and Decrypt Vacated   John Young
• [Cryptography] New NIST standard for Format Preserving Encryption   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] New NIST standard for Format Preserving Encryption   Yaron Sheffer
• [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Faster hashing with twisted computation graphs   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Snowden, Greenwald & Chomsky on Privacy   Henry Baker

Last message date: Thu Mar 31 18:46:00 EDT 2016
Archived on: Thu Mar 31 19:15:17 EDT 2016

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