[Cryptography] DoJ2Apple: Weak crypto req'd so strong crypto is visible

[Henry Baker]

FYI --

https://cryptome.org/2016/03/usg-apple-149.pdf

"Apple speculates that there is no law-enforcement benefit to removing barriers
to unlocking an iPhone because criminals and terrorists will encrypt their data in other
ways.  (Opp. 25.)  If this reasoning were correct, there would be no purpose to wire-taps,
either.

But the reasoning is flawed, for three reasons.

First, as the wire-tap context illustrates, just because criminals can add another layer of security (such as talking in code), they do not always do so.

Second, even if there are further layers of encryption, the government may be able to pierce that encryption—-but only if it can get into the phone in the first place.

Third, even assuming counterfactually that unlocking iPhones would not be useful in the future due to changes in criminal and terrorist behavior, it is useful today for gathering evidence related to the terrorist mass-murder in San Bernardino."

Footnote on DoJ brief p. 24.
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Basically, DoJ/FBI is saying that Apple needs weak encryption, to enable DoJ/FBI to
"see" when strong crypto is being used.  But such weak encryption only makes sense
if you're doing ubiquitous, cheap mass surveillance.

Clearly FBI is now carrying water for the NSA.

This whole case is getting nuttier & nuttier by the day.