[Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009

[Ray Dillinger]

On 03/17/2016 06:23 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> The cost of the PRISM, TAO, etc. programs was needing to preserve the
> vulnerabilities they exploited. And they certainly haven't ended
> completely. Only the other day I found myself having to argue that no,
> a 2^128 work factor is not sufficient for every need and yes we do
> require a 2^256 work factor.
> 
> The original reason I wanted to go to elliptic curves in the first
> place was to get the 2^256 work factor I can't get with RSA without
> silly key sizes (16K). But no, I have to spend time making the case.

I thought maybe I was the only one taking the "quantum crypto"
noise seriously.  Guess not.  Although RSA keys suffer even more
from quantum crypto than they suffer from advances in "standard"
factoring algorithms.

				Bear


-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 819 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20160317/b3033da5/attachment.sig>