March 2016 Archives by subject

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Starting: Tue Mar 1 04:53:36 EST 2016
Ending: Thu Mar 31 18:46:00 EDT 2016
Messages: 514

[Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] "Apple moves to bring iCloud infrastructure in-house predicated by backdoor fears - report" Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] "Tea Consent" video for DoJ/FBI Henry Baker
[Cryptography] "WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order" Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] "WhatsApp Encryption Said to Stymie Wiretap Order" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone danimoth
[Cryptography] 9999 keys for this one iPhone John Levine
[Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Faster hashing with twisted computation graphs Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] USG-Apple - 3/22/16 Hearing Procedures, Add 3 USGs grarpamp
[Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] [cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone John Young
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help" Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] Traffic shaping attack grarpamp
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Ad hominems are not acceptable. Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ADMIN: No top posting, please. Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT) Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT) Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] All applications need top security (was Re: Director GCHQ speaks at MIT) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] And they're off... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] And they're off... Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] And they're off... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] And they're off... Natanael
[Cryptography] And they're off... Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] And they're off... Allen
[Cryptography] And they're off... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] A possibility of good anonymous communications? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] A possibility of good anonymous communications? Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] Apple's appeal brief re NY iPhone iOS7 5s Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple's appeal brief re NY iPhone iOS7 5s Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Apple's suzerainty problem Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple Attorneys Move to Join CA and NY Cases John Young
[Cryptography] Apple Attorneys Move to Join CA and NY Cases John Young
[Cryptography] Apple Buys Ink by the Barrel? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple engineers risk ethics violations if they comply Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Apple GovtOS/FBiOS & Proof of Work Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Apple in EDNY added as interested party in another iPhone case in EDNY John Young
[Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt John Young
[Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Apple Reply to USG Opposition to Vacate Decrypt Henry Baker
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy John Denker
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy David Johnston
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] A question on Shannon's entropy John Denker
[Cryptography] Bloomberg: "Amazon to Restore Encryption on Fire Devices After Cutting Back" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Chertoff Group's new 28-page report on Encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Chosen Ciphertext Attacks on Apple iMessage Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Christophe Petit on ECDLP future advances Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009 Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009 Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Clinton asked for a secure email Blackberry in 2009 Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Code beg... C#... Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Code beg... C#... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Code beg... C#... Dennis E. Hamilton
[Cryptography] Cothority J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] Decentralized cosigning: Apple can't sign on its own Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DEcryption Contract ENforcement Tool (DECENT): A Practical Alternative to Government Decryption Backdoors Peter Linder
[Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Director GCHQ speaks at MIT Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option John Young
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option Ladar Levison
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] DoJ/FBI's "nuclear"/Lavabit option grarpamp
[Cryptography] DoJ2Apple: Weak crypto req'd so strong crypto is visible Henry Baker
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers ianG
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] DROWN attack on SSLv2 enabled servers Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] e-mail giants / IETF dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] e-mail giants / IETF Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Henry Baker
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John Levine
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John Young
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John Young
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Henry Baker
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John Levine
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John Levine
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ron Garret
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ron Garret
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ron Garret
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple grarpamp
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple grarpamp
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple grarpamp
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple grarpamp
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple ianG
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Allen
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] EFF amicus brief in support of Apple Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security Adrian McCullagh
[Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security Henry Baker
[Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] FBI engages Isreali company to crack IPhone security Jack Liddy
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Ilya Levin
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] Formal Verification (was Re: Trust & randomness in computer systems) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? james hughes
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? james hughes
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? ianG
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? ianG
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Gates are cheap. Should cipher design change? Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Google releases new hash function implementations Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Howard Chu
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Erik Granger
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say CANNON NATHANIEL CIOTA
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Say grarpamp
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Says Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Govt Can't Let Smartphones Be 'Black Boxes, ' Obama Says grarpamp
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Matt Johnston
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Help with Raspberry Pi IoT initialization... Peter Todd
[Cryptography] HohhaDynamicXOR is broken Oscar
[Cryptography] iMessage cryptography is broken Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] iPhone hardware attacks grarpamp
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Charlie Kaufman
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Allen
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Allen
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Jonathan Katz
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Is Non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proof an oxymoron? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known? david wong
[Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Is the real cause of the recent socat error now known? david wong
[Cryptography] is this feudalism? J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] is this feudalism? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] is this feudalism? J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos John Young
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos John Young
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Ladar Levison
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Ladar Levison
[Cryptography] Lavabit's and Snowden's Solos Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN Henry Baker
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN grarpamp
[Cryptography] LibreSSL unaffected by DROWN Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] McAfee: NSA Juniper backdoor used by China to clean out OPM/DOD/IRS/... ianG
[Cryptography] Michael Chertoff uses 2nd Amendment arg for encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Michael Hayden supports Apple Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] Microsoft remote desktop updates Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Mike Masnick (Techdirt) explains DoJ v. Apple Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? ianG
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Mixing public key crypto systems? Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] More Apple news Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] More Apple news grarpamp
[Cryptography] More Apple news Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] More Apple news Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] More Apple news Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] More Apple news Allen
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) grarpamp
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) Henry Baker
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) grarpamp
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) ianG
[Cryptography] More Bad Govt Shit To Fight (Burner Verizon FBI) Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Motherboard article on Lavabit case Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Motherboard article on Lavabit case Ladar Levison
[Cryptography] MSFT's Win10, Chinese Edition Henry Baker
[Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud Henry Baker
[Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud Henry Baker
[Cryptography] MSFT doesn't retain keys for its own German cloud Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] New IETF draft on proposed best practices -- feedback wanted Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] New NIST standard for Format Preserving Encryption Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] New NIST standard for Format Preserving Encryption Yaron Sheffer
[Cryptography] News flash: FBI in the "dark" about "numbers" radio stations Henry Baker
[Cryptography] News flash: FBI in the "dark" about "numbers" radio stations Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] NYT: "Competing Interests on Encryption Divide Top Obama Officials" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Official (?) govt crypto characters Henry Baker
[Cryptography] On simple and public cryptography mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin John Levine
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin John Levine
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Krisztián Pintér
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Peter Todd
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin John Levine
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Lee Clagett
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Alfie John
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Alfie John
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] On the 'regulation proof' aspect of Bitcoin Natanael
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ron Garret
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Aaron Zauner
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ron Garret
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture ianG
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture ianG
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Jonathan Katz
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture ianG
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture ianG
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Nemo
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ron Garret
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Nemo
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Nemo
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture ianG
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Ron Garret
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] OTP phones - arrested for buying phones. Peter Trei
[Cryptography] OTP phones - arrested for buying phones. Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones John Levine
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] Paris attackers used OTP's: One Time Phones Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Possibility of a quick solution of security of communications of the common people? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Q: Status quo of key exchange via neural syncronization mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Q: Status quo of key exchange via neural syncronization Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Quantum cryptography for book entry transaction settlement? Robert Hettinga
[Cryptography] Richard Clarke interviewed on NPR's Morning Edition Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Secret key agreement by public discussion from common information Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Side channel attack on OpenSSL ECDSA on iOS and Android Hanno Böck
[Cryptography] Skipjack is dead. Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Smallest 4-bit S-box? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Snowden's email unredacted in Lavabit dox Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Snowden, Greenwald & Chomsky on Privacy Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Susan Landau's written testimony before the House Judiciary Committee Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Susan Landau's written testimony before the House Judiciary Committee =JeffH
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Ron Garret
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help John Gilmore
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help james hughes
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Natanael
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Ron Garret
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] The FBI can (almost certainly) crack the San Bernardino iPhone without Apple's help Natanael
[Cryptography] The rewards of frenzied comsec-shopping should be a pardon for Snowden John Young
[Cryptography] This is not the end... Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] This is not the end... Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] This is not the end... grarpamp
[Cryptography] This is not the end... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet Troy Benjegerdes
[Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] This is why we have Stuxnet Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Time Magazine on Apple vs. FBI Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] TLS 1.2 Long Term Support Profile Draft RFC Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems rcs at xmission.com
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems Natanael
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Trust & randomness in computer systems Arnold Reinhold
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs Allen
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs grarpamp
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Two more Apple amicus briefs James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] Two questions of security Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Two questions of security Natanael
[Cryptography] Two questions of security Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] UK GCHQ finally declassifies Ellis papers on public key crypto Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Max Kington
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair John Denker
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Charles Jackson
[Cryptography] Unicity distance of Playfair Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] USG-Apple - 3/22/16 Hearing Procedures, Add 3 USGs John Young
[Cryptography] USG-Apple Hearing Vacated, Decrypt Order Stayed John Young
[Cryptography] USG-Apple Oral Proceedings Transcript 21 March 2016 John Young
[Cryptography] USG-Apple Orders to Assist Search and Decrypt Vacated John Young
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order John Young
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order John Young
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Bill Cox
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order John Levine
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order james hughes
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order John Levine
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Ron Garret
[Cryptography] USG Moves to Vacate Apple Decrypt Order Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone John Young
[Cryptography] USG moves to vacate hearing tomorrow due to possible method to unlock iPhone Henry Baker
[Cryptography] USG Support of Motion to Compel Apple Decrypt, iPhone Forensics John Young
[Cryptography] USG v. Apple - Amici Applications Through 3 March 2016 John Young
[Cryptography] USG v. Lavabit-Snowden Files Unsealed John Young
[Cryptography] USG v. Lavabit-Snowden Files Unsealed Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Vice: Amazon removes full disk encryption from its Android devices Gé Weijers
[Cryptography] Washington Post op ed by Apple's Craig Federighi Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Washington Post op ed by Apple's Craig Federighi John Young
[Cryptography] What if DoJ breaks Apple's chain-of-trust? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] What is Apple's public signing key? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] What is Apple's public signing key? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] When did Apple customers stop beating their wives? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Whit Diffie and Martin Hellman win ACM Turing Award Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted John Levine
[Cryptography] Wire.com: private communications, always encrypted Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Wired: "How the Feds Could Get Into iPhones Without Apple’s Help" John Levine
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") ianG
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Jonathan Katz
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Would open source solve current security issues? (was "Re: EFF amicus brief in support of Apple") Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code" Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code" ianG
[Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code" Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] ZDNet: "US government pushed tech firms to hand over source code" Ladar Levison

Last message date: Thu Mar 31 18:46:00 EDT 2016
Archived on: Thu Mar 31 19:15:17 EDT 2016

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