April 2016 Archives by date

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Starting: Fri Apr 1 10:41:17 EDT 2016
Ending: Sat Apr 30 18:57:57 EDT 2016
Messages: 336

[Cryptography] Apple To Buy CryptoWall for $10 Billion Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Case-Sensitive letter frequencies mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] O(q^(1/24)) ECDLP attack? David Johnston
[Cryptography] Alabama governor purchased multiple 'burner' phones Henry Baker
[Cryptography] O(q^(1/24)) ECDLP attack? Allen
[Cryptography] O(q^(1/24)) ECDLP attack? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] O(q^(1/24)) ECDLP attack? Lee Clagett
[Cryptography] Have you seen... Allen Schaaf
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Coded sentences mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Have you seen... Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Near field and crypto Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Near field and crypto Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Have you seen... John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Near field and crypto Natanael
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Allen
[Cryptography] Near field and crypto Sean Lynch
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Krisztián Pintér
[Cryptography] [Endymail] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
[Cryptography] Have you seen... Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] Transcript Collision Attacks: Breaking Authentication in TLS, IKE, and SSH ianG
[Cryptography] [messaging] [Endymail] Secure universal message addressing Harlan Lieberman-Berg
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Have you seen... Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Henry Baker
[Cryptography] On the Impending Crypto Monoculture Werner Koch
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] A humble recommendation Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] A humble recommendation grarpamp
[Cryptography] connectivity without complete loss of privacy John Denker
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? david wong
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing aestetix
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing John Levine
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? fcorella at pomcor.com
[Cryptography] On improving the performance of the classical Playfair cipher mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Have you seen... Allen Schaaf
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] the Herival tip - hut 6 ianG
[Cryptography] Hayden on encryption v. metadata Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Hillery's Email Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] On improving the performance of the classical Playfair cipher mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Hillery's Email Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing John Levine
[Cryptography] Hillery's Email Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Ángel González
[Cryptography] On improving the performance of the classical Playfair cipher Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Hillery's Email Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Brian Gladman
[Cryptography] On improving the performance of the classical Playfair cipher mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Simon A
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Bill Cox
[Cryptography] CFRG crypto review team Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? david wong
[Cryptography] DoJ to pursue Brooklyn Apple v FBI iPhone unlock case James S. Tyre
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Allen
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Trevor Perrin
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Donald Eastlake
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Hillery's Email Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Silly idea for WhatsApp MitM protection for the masses Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] What standards are there for post-quantum certificates? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] What standards are there for post-quantum certificates? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] What standards are there for post-quantum certificates? Hanno Böck
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? fcorella at pomcor.com
[Cryptography] Windows Bash Henry Baker
[Cryptography] What standards are there for post-quantum certificates? Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] More magical encryption thinking from James Comey Henry Baker
[Cryptography] WaveCrypt Mihai Ionut
[Cryptography] More magical encryption thinking from James Comey Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] More magical encryption thinking from James Comey Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Text of Burr-Feinstein encryption backdoor bill Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Trevor Perrin
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] More magical encryption thinking from James Comey John Levine
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Nemo
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Is storing a hash of a private key a security risk? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Trevor Perrin
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? fcorella at pomcor.com
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM John Ioannidis
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Feds say they hired a hardware hacker to crack the San Bernardino phone John Levine
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] TLS 1.3 PSK 0-RTT with replay protection seems pretty safe Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Feinstein-Burr crypto bill introduced John Levine
[Cryptography] network encryption/authentication without certificate PKI Devin Reade
[Cryptography] Fwd: [messaging] WaveCrypt Mihai Ionut
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Feinstein-Burr crypto bill introduced Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Cryptography being defended on social media and YouTube. This is on the front page of reddit right now Erik Granger
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Henry Baker
[Cryptography] TLS 1.3 PSK 0-RTT with replay protection seems pretty safe Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Show Crypto: prototype USB HSM Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Feinstein-Burr crypto bill introduced Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Henry Baker
Canadian Police Had BlackBerry�s Global Decryption Key since 2010 Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Alexandre Anzala-Yamajako
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Andrew Donoho
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Canadian Police Had BlackBerrys Global Decryption Key since 2010 D. Hugh Redelmeier
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Canadian Police Had BlackBerry’s Global Decryption Key since 2010 Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? sebastien riou
[Cryptography] Canadian Police Had BlackBerry’s Global Decryption Key since 2010 John Levine
[Cryptography] RCMP Had BlackBerry's Global Decryption Key since 2010 Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? fcorella at pomcor.com
[Cryptography] RCMP Had BlackBerry's Global Decryption Key since 2010 John Levine
[Cryptography] RCMP Had BlackBerry's Global Decryption Key since 2010 Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS? Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Melinda Shore
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Simple IoT sensor encryption ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Pete
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] "60 Minutes" hacks Congressman's phone Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Security engineering at Google Tim Dierks
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? hbaker1
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? John Denker
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? John Levine
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Canadian Police Had BlackBerry’s Global Decryption Key since 2010 Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing John Levine
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] "60 Minutes" hacks Congressman's phone Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] 'Canary Numbers' for online testing of TRNG's Henry Baker
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] UK's Investigatory Powers Bill can 'force' decryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing Natanael
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] [cryptography] Secure universal message addressing John Levine
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau Explains Quantum Computing Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Valmiky Arquissandas
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs james hughes
[Cryptography] Is "drivers for foo" a major malware vector? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Darren Lasko
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs RB
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Valmiky Arquissandas
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Linus van Geuns
[Cryptography] UK gang bought guns from same shop as Charlie Hebdo terrorists Jack Liddy
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs RB
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Valmiky Arquissandas
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs james hughes
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] compact Ed25519 multi-signatures Allen
[Cryptography] a little bit of history dan at geer.org
[Cryptography] Security on TRIM for full-disk encrypted SSDs Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Fun crypto puzzles, one easy, two impossible Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Fun crypto puzzles, one easy, two impossible Bill Cox
[Cryptography] non-interactive multi-signature algorithm? Allen
[Cryptography] compact Ed25519 multi-signatures zaki at manian.org
[Cryptography] a little bit of history mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] SIGSALY, was a little bit of history John Levine
[Cryptography] How to get certificates on email server? grarpamp
[Cryptography] Fun crypto puzzles, one easy, two impossible Bill Cox
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? David Johnston
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? John Ioannidis
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? John Levine
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] what crypto stuff to buy? david wong
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Alfie John
[Cryptography] what crypto stuff to buy? Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains grarpamp
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains grarpamp
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? David Johnston
[Cryptography] Current state of WPA2 security for IoT access ? RB
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Pragmatic, column-level data encryption at rest. Possible? Jaycevee
[Cryptography] A complete guide to the new 'Crypto Wars' grarpamp
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Pragmatic, column-level data encryption at rest. Possible? Jonathan Katz
[Cryptography] Pragmatic, column-level data encryption at rest. Possible? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains John Levine
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] Darpa wants a secure messaging app based on blockchains Henry Baker
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? david wong
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? david wong
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs grarpamp
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? grarpamp
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] YouTube ContentID hacked for the good! Henry Baker
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] [tor-talk] Supreme Court Gives FBI More Hacking Power grarpamp
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? J.M. Porup
[Cryptography] WhatsApp: Why asymmetric key instead of symmetric keys? Ismail Kizir
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs arxlight
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, Claude Shannon! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] More speculation on cryptographic breakthroughs. Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] More speculation on cryptographic breakthroughs. Jeff Burdges
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] USB 3.0 authentication Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Yui Hirasawa
[Cryptography] Fun crypto puzzles, one easy, two impossible Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Mathematics of variable substitutions? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Mathematics of variable substitutions? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Mathematics of variable substitutions? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs arxlight
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs arxlight
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed Henry Baker
[Cryptography] US Case: Infinite Jail Contempt for Disk Crypto, 5th Amndmnt, All Writs, FileVault, Freenet CHKs Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed Bill Cox
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed Mark Steward
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed Henry Baker
[Cryptography] sha1sum speed RB
[Cryptography] Mathematics of variable substitutions? Watson Ladd

Last message date: Sat Apr 30 18:57:57 EDT 2016
Archived on: Sun May 1 02:17:46 EDT 2016

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