[Cryptography] Hillery's Email

[Phillip Hallam-Baker]

On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 2:42 AM, Bill Frantz <frantz at pwpconsult.com> wrote:
> In another thread, Tom Mitchell wrote:
>
>> In the common use and common purpose case it seems OK to me.
>> In all, it is a step up from the management of Hillary's email.
>
>
> What do we know about the management of Hillery's email? I do know that the
> government systems have had enough breaks that a private system may well
> have been better protected. Also that while Obama managed to get a
> more-or-less secure Blackberry, Hillery couldn't get one when she was
> Secretary of State. Otherwise, I'm woefully ignorant.

We know that the State Dept cables were leaked by a political opponent
(Chelsea Manning). We also know that every secretary of state who has
had email has been on a private net (Powell, Rice, Clinton) or on
NIPRNET (Kerry) which is not secure. We also know that SMTP email is
not secure without end-to-end layered encryption that makes the
placement of the mail server irrelevant.

My experience of the EOP systems in the Clinton WH was that the
X.500/SMTP mail systems were treated as telephone calls - assume they
are insecure. I am certain that dealing with the actual TOP SECRET/CSI
material would be the job of a dedicated staff.

What is really annoying me here is that there is a huge sound and
furry that Clinton did not choose to make use of a mail server that
was insecure would allow her political opponents to illegally leak
information to her political opponents in congress and there is
absolutely no attention given to the fact that 20 years after email
security became practical, it still isn't ubiquitous.

That is one of the things I want to change with the Mesh.