[Cryptography] At what point should people not use TLS?

Jerry Leichter leichter at lrw.com
Tue Apr 12 17:35:17 EDT 2016


> Abbreviated handshake
> ---------------------------------
> TLS session resumption is based on caching the original session's
> master secret.  So forward secrecy and resistance to "key-compromise
> impersonation" is reduced: if the cached master secret is stolen from
> the client or server, older sessions can be decrypted and the server
> can be impersonated.
I haven't looked at the whole protocol so may well be missing something essential, but the forward secrecy part seems easy to fix:  Rather than caching the original session's master secret, cache its one-way hash.  Assuming both ends do this, any further communication continues exactly as before, for better or worse - as long as both ends do the same thing, they agree on the cached value and it's just as good a master secret as the original.  But compromise of the cached value now provides no information about previous messages.
                                                        -- Jerry



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