February 2017 Archives by thread

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Starting: Wed Feb 1 01:09:43 EST 2017
Ending: Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Messages: 318

• [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES   Alfie John
• [Cryptography] Firewall penetration   James A. Donald
  • [Cryptography] Firewall penetration   Jason Richards
  • [Cryptography] Firewall penetration   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Firewall penetration   Jehan Tremback
      • [Cryptography] Firewall penetration   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Francisco Corella
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Francisco Corella
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   Jameson Lopp
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   arxlight
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   Patrick
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   Patrick Chkoreff
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   Patrick Chkoreff
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?   Richard Outerbridge
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?   James Cloos
      • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?   Dennis E. Hamilton
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress.   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress.   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] Schnor's algorithm vs qubit quantity [Was: Re: Quantum and continuous progress.]   James Cloos
• [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??   Rui Paulo
• [Cryptography] [ray at unipay.nl: [fc-announce] Call for Participation: FC17 (registration now open, early registration deadline in 2 weeks)]   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Pure Randomness Extracted from Two Poor Sources   dj at deadhat.com
• [Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] (Non)Random news   Barney Wolff
  • [Cryptography] (Non)Random news   Yoha
• [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Salz, Rich
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Ben Tasker
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   J. Oquendo
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Fairbrother
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   L Jean Camp
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
    • [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?   Joseph Kilcullen
• [Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] Matasano, the cryptopals crypto challenges   Peressim
• [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP   james hughes
  • [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Jason Cooper
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   James A. Donald
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Patrick
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Patrick Chkoreff
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Patrick Chkoreff
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Ilya Levin
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof   Ilya Levin
• [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Mike Hamburg
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Wasa Bee
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Dirk-Willem van Gulik
      • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Wouter Slegers
  • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?   Bill Cox
• [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Paul F Fraser
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Paul F Fraser
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Paul F Fraser
      • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Paul F Fraser
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Bill Stewart
  • [Cryptography] Verification of Identity   Kevin W. Wall
• [Cryptography] Fwd: Securing the full TLS handshake including SNI   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
  • [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent   Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
• [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Florian Weimer
    • [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Walter van Holst
    • [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll   Christian Huitema
• [Cryptography] Fwd: announcing: txmix, a twisted python mixnet library   Moritz Bartl
• [Cryptography] Practical SHA-1 collisions   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Michael Kjörling
  • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Nikita Borisov
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack   Phillip Hallam-Baker
• [Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision   Derek Atkins
  • [Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision   Patrick Chkoreff
• [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] [bitcoin-dev] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   William Muriithi
      • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Theodore Ts'o
    • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Jason Cooper
    • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   Jason Cooper
  • [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers   John Gilmore
• [Cryptography] Verification Tools   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] Verification Tools   Allen
• [Cryptography] Risks of IOT   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Patrick Chkoreff
      • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Patrick Chkoreff
    • [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Ian G
  • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Peter Todd
    • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Kevin W. Wall
    • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Ian G
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   James A. Donald
    • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Julian Macassey
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Michael Marking
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Ben Tasker
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Donald Eastlake
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] shielding   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] jammers, nor not   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Benjamin Kreuter
    • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   John Levine
  • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do   Paul Renault
• [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN   John Ioannidis
• [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?   Perry E. Metzger
    • [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Andrew P. Lentvorski
  • [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Allen
    • [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Allen
  • [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Andrew P. Lentvorski
      • [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery   Jan Moritz Lindemann
  • [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery   Harald Koch
• [Cryptography] Soliciting code review for a double-ratchet implementation in Javascript   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] Updating firmware/hardware   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10   Marshall Pierce
  • [Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10   James A. Donald
• [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation   Darren Moffat
  • [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation   Natanael
• [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed   Salz, Rich

Last message date: Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Archived on: Wed Mar 1 11:36:25 EST 2017

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