February 2017 Archives by subject
Starting: Wed Feb 1 01:09:43 EST 2017
Ending: Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Messages: 318
- [Cryptography] (Non)Random news
Barney Wolff
- [Cryptography] (Non)Random news
Yoha
- [Cryptography] [bitcoin-dev] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Natanael
- [Cryptography] [ray at unipay.nl: [fc-announce] Call for Participation: FC17 (registration now open, early registration deadline in 2 weeks)]
R. Hirschfeld
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed
Natanael
- [Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed
Salz, Rich
- [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP
John Denker
- [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP
james hughes
- [Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Firewall penetration
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Firewall penetration
Jason Richards
- [Cryptography] Firewall penetration
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Firewall penetration
Jehan Tremback
- [Cryptography] Firewall penetration
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES
John Gilmore
- [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES
Alfie John
- [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion
John Denker
- [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF
Bill Frantz
- [Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF
Ben Laurie
- [Cryptography] Fwd: announcing: txmix, a twisted python mixnet library
Moritz Bartl
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Fwd: Securing the full TLS handshake including SNI
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?
Richard Outerbridge
- [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume?
James Cloos
- [Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning
Georgi Guninski
- [Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Florian Weimer
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Walter van Holst
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Christian Huitema
- [Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision
Derek Atkins
- [Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Michael Kjörling
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Nikita Borisov
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!
Dave Horsfall
- [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle!
Bill Frantz
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Mike Hamburg
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Wasa Bee
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Dirk-Willem van Gulik
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
grarpamp
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Dirk-Willem van Gulik
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Wouter Slegers
- [Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack?
Florian Weimer
- [Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10
Marshall Pierce
- [Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ??
Rui Paulo
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
John Denker
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Ben Tasker
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
mok-kong shen
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Jonathan Thornburg
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Donald Eastlake
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
grarpamp
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Julian Macassey
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Michael Marking
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Bill Frantz
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] jammers, nor not
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Viktor Dukhovni
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious...
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent
Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
- [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent
Jon Callas
- [Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent
Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
- [Cryptography] Matasano, the cryptopals crypto challenges
Peressim
- [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?
Natanael
- [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ?
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Andrew P. Lentvorski
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Allen
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Andrew P. Lentvorski
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Allen
- [Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Practical SHA-1 collisions
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Pure Randomness Extracted from Two Poor Sources
dj at deadhat.com
- [Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress.
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress.
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Risks of IOT
mok-kong shen
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Ian G
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Benjamin Kreuter
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Ian G
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
mok-kong shen
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
John Levine
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Paul Renault
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Henry Baker
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Schnor's algorithm vs qubit quantity [Was: Re: Quantum and continuous progress.]
James Cloos
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Bill Frantz
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Jon Callas
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Bill Frantz
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Jonathan Thornburg
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Jason Cooper
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Ben Laurie
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Benjamin Kreuter
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Benjamin Kreuter
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Patrick
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Ilya Levin
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Ilya Levin
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Florian Weimer
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Patrick Chkoreff
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Perry E. Metzger
- [Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN
John Ioannidis
- [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery
Jan Moritz Lindemann
- [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery
Harald Koch
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
John Levine
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Phillip Hallam-Baker
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
William Muriithi
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Peter Todd
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Jason Cooper
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
Jason Cooper
- [Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers
John Gilmore
- [Cryptography] shielding
John Denker
- [Cryptography] Soliciting code review for a double-ratchet implementation in Javascript
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Natanael
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Salz, Rich
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Theodore Ts'o
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
J. Oquendo
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Salz, Rich
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Ben Tasker
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Fairbrother
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Natanael
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Salz, Rich
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
L Jean Camp
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Thierry Moreau
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Bill Cox
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Tom Mitchell
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?
Joseph Kilcullen
- [Cryptography] Updating firmware/hardware
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Paul F Fraser
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Paul F Fraser
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
John Levine
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Bill Stewart
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Kevin W. Wall
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Paul F Fraser
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
John Levine
- [Cryptography] Verification of Identity
Paul F Fraser
- [Cryptography] Verification Tools
Ben Laurie
- [Cryptography] Verification Tools
Allen
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
John Levine
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
Jameson Lopp
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
arxlight
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
James A. Donald
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
Natanael
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume?
Patrick
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Stephen Farrell
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Salz, Rich
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Francisco Corella
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Ron Garret
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Stephen Farrell
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Francisco Corella
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Peter Gutmann
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Jerry Leichter
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Dennis E. Hamilton
- [Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed?
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation
Darren Moffat
- [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation
Ray Dillinger
- [Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation
Natanael
Last message date:
Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Archived on: Wed Mar 1 11:36:25 EST 2017
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