February 2017 Archives by subject

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Starting: Wed Feb 1 01:09:43 EST 2017
Ending: Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Messages: 318

[Cryptography] (Non)Random news Barney Wolff
[Cryptography] (Non)Random news Yoha
[Cryptography] [bitcoin-dev] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Peter Todd
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Natanael
[Cryptography] [ray at unipay.nl: [fc-announce] Call for Participation: FC17 (registration now open, early registration deadline in 2 weeks)] R. Hirschfeld
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? John Levine
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? John Levine
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? John Levine
[Cryptography] A little history, was What is total world transaction volume? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed Natanael
[Cryptography] Attaching the signing public key to data being signed Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP John Denker
[Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP james hughes
[Cryptography] detention and/or seizure if you don't give your passphrase to US CBP Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Firewall penetration James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Firewall penetration Jason Richards
[Cryptography] Firewall penetration Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Firewall penetration Jehan Tremback
[Cryptography] Firewall penetration Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES John Gilmore
[Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES Ron Garret
[Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES Ron Garret
[Cryptography] FOI of NSA's cryptanalysis of DES Alfie John
[Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion John Denker
[Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] formal verification +- resource exhaustion Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Fwd: [Trans] Internet-level Consensus - new list and possible BoF Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Fwd: announcing: txmix, a twisted python mixnet library Moritz Bartl
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: [FORGED] Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Fwd: Re: So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Fwd: Securing the full TLS handshake including SNI Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume? Richard Outerbridge
[Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume? John Levine
[Cryptography] Fwd: What is total world transaction volume? James Cloos
[Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning Georgi Guninski
[Cryptography] FYI: quantum cloning Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Henry Baker
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Walter van Holst
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] German govt tells parents to destroy WiFi-connected doll Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision Derek Atkins
[Cryptography] Google announces concrete SHA-1 collision Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Nikita Borisov
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Google announces practical SHA-1 collision attack Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, Ralph Merkle! Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Mike Hamburg
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Wasa Bee
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? grarpamp
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Dirk-Willem van Gulik
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Wouter Slegers
[Cryptography] HSMs or Intel SGX? Which is harder to hack? Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10 Marshall Pierce
[Cryptography] Improvements to RNG seeding in Linux 4.10 James A. Donald
[Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ?? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ?? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] IRS W-2 'Verification Code' == Hash ?? Rui Paulo
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not John Denker
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Ron Garret
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Henry Baker
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Ben Tasker
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Henry Baker
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Donald Eastlake
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Ron Garret
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not grarpamp
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Julian Macassey
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Michael Marking
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] jammers, nor not Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Just in case it isn't obvious... Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
[Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Lower bound for the size of an RSA key's private exponent Bertrand Mollinier Toublet
[Cryptography] Matasano, the cryptopals crypto challenges Peressim
[Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ? Natanael
[Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ? Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] More efficient block-chain ledger: Micali's "Algorand" ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Andrew P. Lentvorski
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Allen
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Andrew P. Lentvorski
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Allen
[Cryptography] PAKE for embedded device (<64K RAM)? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Practical SHA-1 collisions Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Pure Randomness Extracted from Two Poor Sources dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress. Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Quantum and continuous progress. James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Risks of IOT mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Ian G
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Ian G
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do mok-kong shen
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Peter Todd
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do John Levine
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Paul Renault
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Schneier's Internet Security Agency - bad idea because we don't know what it will do James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Schnor's algorithm vs qubit quantity [Was: Re: Quantum and continuous progress.] James Cloos
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Jason Cooper
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Patrick
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Ilya Levin
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Ilya Levin
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Patrick Chkoreff
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof James A. Donald
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Perry E. Metzger
[Cryptography] Security proofs prove non-failproof Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] SHA-1 collision broke SVN John Ioannidis
[Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery Jan Moritz Lindemann
[Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] SHA-1 collision could also allow ePassport forgery Harald Koch
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Peter Todd
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers John Levine
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Peter Todd
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers William Muriithi
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Peter Todd
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Jason Cooper
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers Jason Cooper
[Cryptography] SHA1 collisions make Git vulnerable to attakcs by third-parties, not just repo maintainers John Gilmore
[Cryptography] shielding John Denker
[Cryptography] Soliciting code review for a double-ratchet implementation in Javascript Ron Garret
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Natanael
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Theodore Ts'o
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? J. Oquendo
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Ben Tasker
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Natanael
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? L Jean Camp
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? John Levine
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? John Levine
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong? Joseph Kilcullen
[Cryptography] Updating firmware/hardware Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Paul F Fraser
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Paul F Fraser
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity John Levine
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Bill Stewart
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Paul F Fraser
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity John Levine
[Cryptography] Verification of Identity Paul F Fraser
[Cryptography] Verification Tools Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] Verification Tools Allen
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? John Levine
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? Jameson Lopp
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? arxlight
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? James A. Donald
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? Natanael
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] What is total world transaction volume? Patrick
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Francisco Corella
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Dennis E. Hamilton
[Cryptography] Why is a short HMAC key zero-padded instead of hashed? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation Darren Moffat
[Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] XTS mode IV generation Natanael

Last message date: Tue Feb 28 22:35:27 EST 2017
Archived on: Wed Mar 1 11:36:25 EST 2017

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