[Cryptography] So please tell me. Why is my solution wrong?

[James A. Donald]

On 2/9/2017 4:06 AM, Joseph Kilcullen wrote:
> Cool question. The whole point is that TLS fails in one TINY area. To
> protect usernames and passwords the identity of the remote website MUST
> be authenticated. My research indicates an un-counterfeitable login
> screen is needed.

Which is the unforgeable UI of a Zero-knowledge password proof, where 
both parties prove they know the password without giving the password 
away to each other.

This stops phishing and spearphishing, which in this election was a 
major national security issue and major private security issue, since 
Clinton and her team had a pile of state secrets valuable to the enemies 
of the united states in their email, and a pile of political secrets 
valuable to the enemies of Clinton in their email.

Another problem that needs fixing is keeping piles of emails on the 
server in the clear, which provoked Secretary of State Clinton to keep 
her emails on a thumbdrive that she personally controlled.  Secretary of 
State Clinton did not want her people's emails sitting on a system that 
President Obama's people could physically get at.

Though in the end everyone from the Russians to the Chans did get her 
emails, due to spearphishing, weak passwords, and insider sexual misconduct.

What should happen is that when both parties are logged in with their 
respective email servers at the same time, their respective email 
servers should arrange a direct encrypted connection between their 
respective email clients, so that messages pass directly from one client 
computer to the other, so that Clinton's emails do not pass through 
Obama's servers.

We cannot do much about insider sexual misconduct, but direct client to 
client transmission of emails at least mitigates that problem substantially.