September 2015 Archives by thread

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...

Starting: Tue Sep 1 02:16:29 EDT 2015
Ending: Wed Sep 30 23:22:10 EDT 2015
Messages: 253

• [Cryptography] Ratcheting   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Ratcheting   Brendan Farmer
• [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   ianG
    • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Steve Weis
      • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   ianG
  • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   ianG
    • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Stephen Farrell
  • [Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Erik Granger
  • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing   Steve Weis
• [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   matic at nimp.co.uk
  • [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   Steve Weis
    • [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   Steve Weis
      • [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   sebastien riou
  • [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   Jon Callas
    • [Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption   sebastien riou
• [Cryptography] SRP for mutual authentication - as an alternative / addition to certificates?   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   EddyHawk
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Guus Sliepen
    • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys   Philip Gladstone
• [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Florian Weimer
  • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Florian Weimer
  • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Florian Weimer
  • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults   Florian Weimer
• [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   Grant Schultz
  • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   Grant Schultz
    • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   Grant Schultz
      • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea   Ángel González
• [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Cat Okita
  • [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Salz, Rich
    • [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Elgamal Variant   Nathaniel McCallum
  • [Cryptography] Elgamal Variant   Nathaniel McCallum
    • [Cryptography] Elgamal Variant   Nathaniel McCallum
• Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Allen Schaaf
  • [Cryptography] Apple’s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   John-Mark Gurney
  • [Cryptography] Apple’s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Apple’s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw   Allen
• [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Paul Ferguson
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   John Kelsey
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Allen
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   ianG
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Kevin W. Wall
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   WebDawg
      • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   arxlight
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ?   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ?   Peter Fairbrother
• [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Tony Arcieri
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Peter Fairbrother
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Phillip Hallam-Baker
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Benjamin Kreuter
    • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Benjamin Kreuter
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] sibyl attacks   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Devin Reade
      • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Devin Reade
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Florian Weimer
    • [Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] [jensg at ist.psu.edu: [fc-announce] FC 2016 - Call for Papers + Announcements]   R. Hirschfeld
• [Cryptography] Let's Encrypt: Hello World!   Jeroen van der Ham
  • [Cryptography] Let's Encrypt: Hello World!   Salz, Rich
• [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Rob S.
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Tony Arcieri
  • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Joachim Strömbergson
    • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised   John Young
  • [Cryptography] [cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised   Paul Wouters
    • [Cryptography] [cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised   John Young
      • [Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised   Nicholas Cole
• [Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities   Salz, Rich
    • [Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities   Dave Howe
      • [Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Passphrase Are Secure   John Young
• [Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data   Dave Howe
    • [Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] Key Compromise Related to Architectural Work Not Cryptome   John Young
• [Cryptography] The default password of '1234'   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] The default password of '1234'   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] The default password of '1234'   ianG
    • [Cryptography] The default password of '1234'   Paul Madore
      • [Cryptography] The default password of '1234'   ianG
• [Cryptography] Python Rumpelstiltskin-tree library + demo tool   Rob Meijer
• [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Ilya Kasnacheev
  • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Christian Huitema
  • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Howard Chu
    • [Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Howard Chu
  • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] An observation on a Skipjack-style Feistel network   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ilya Kasnacheev
  • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Bill Cox
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] rejecting 3rd party web accesses/cookies   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ilya Kasnacheev
  • [Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea   Ilya Kasnacheev
• [Cryptography] Sixteen chars crashes chrome....   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Sixteen chars crashes chrome....   Bill Frantz
• [Cryptography] TRR: Anonymization Technology for Bitcoin   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Davy Durham
  • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Guus Sliepen
  • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Philipp Gühring
    • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Kristian Gjøsteen
      • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement   Davy Durham
• [Cryptography] Curious about FIDO Alliance authentication scheme   Thierry Moreau
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List   Tamzen Cannoy
• [Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system   Viktor Dukhovni
    • [Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Bill Cox
    • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Salz, Rich
  • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Darkpassenger
  • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Ryan Carboni
    • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS   Ryan Carboni
• [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Phillip Hallam-Baker
    • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Aram Perez
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Chris Tonkinson
    • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   dj at deadhat.com
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   John-Mark Gurney
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] ADMIN Re: VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Tamzen Cannoy
  • [Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Natanael
    • [Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ?   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, James Ellis!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] WashPo: Obama admin backdoor proposals   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] GCHQ Cryptome surveillance   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] NSA/GCHQ put their heads together to discuss encryption on the net   root
• [Cryptography] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious   Ryan Carboni
  • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] Google AdSense vuln de-obfuscates ad links for click fraud   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   phm
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Paul Wouters
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Ralf Senderek
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Michael Kjörling
    • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Allen
    • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Nicolai
    • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   Werner Koch
    • [Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP   phm
• [Cryptography] Why is ECC secure?   Bill Cox
  • [Cryptography] Why is ECC secure?   Viktor Dukhovni
• [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Fearghas McKay
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Watson Ladd
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   John Levine
    • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Paul Ferguson
  • [Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow   Allen
• [Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing   ianG

Last message date: Wed Sep 30 23:22:10 EDT 2015
Archived on: Wed Sep 30 23:37:56 EDT 2015

• Messages sorted by: [ subject ] [ author ] [ date ]
• More info on this list...