[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS

Ryan Carboni ryacko at gmail.com
Fri Sep 25 03:10:44 EDT 2015

On Thu, Sep 24, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Salz, Rich <rsalz at akamai.com> wrote:

> > Average webpage 2 MB.
> > Average US internet speed is ~12 Mbps.
> > Time to download the webpage: 1.3 seconds if you're sitting on top of
> the server.
> I don't know what you're trying to say, but your basic concept is flawed.
> From what we see, the average site has 120 HTTP requests per page.
> Cellular latency (and the net is going mobile) is 5-10 times higher than
> your typical home wired network.
> Again, it's all about removing round-trips.  The CPU cost is noise.
>         /r$
> --
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
> IM: richsalz at jabber.at Twitter: RichSalz

Minimum latency is 1.3 seconds, which is a noticeable amount of time? Once
the amount of time it takes to load something is noticeable, it's a
problem. I'm only talking about cost-benefits anyway, and there's a fixed

Typical home wired network? Surely you mean typical wireless home network?
5-10 milliseconds isn't the noticeable component of a problem. Not every
website is run by Google, who relentlessly optimize everything.


While downgrade attacks may be a problem (which is solved in TLS 1.3,
right?), authentication-only cipher suites being enabled on the client-end
would prevent man-in-the-middle attacks and allow for cache engines to work.

On another note, given the long lead times in deploying a new cryptographic
protocol, it might be best to include a post-quantum cipher in TLS 1.3.
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