September 2015 Archives by date

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Starting: Tue Sep 1 02:16:29 EDT 2015
Ending: Wed Sep 30 23:22:10 EDT 2015
Messages: 253

[Cryptography] Ratcheting Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Erik Granger
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Steve Weis
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption matic at nimp.co.uk
[Cryptography] Ratcheting Brendan Farmer
[Cryptography] SRP for mutual authentication - as an alternative / addition to certificates? Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption Steve Weis
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption Jon Callas
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption Steve Weis
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption sebastien riou
[Cryptography] mode of operation for file encryption sebastien riou
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing ianG
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing ianG
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys John Denker
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Steve Weis
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing ianG
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Guus Sliepen
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea Grant Schultz
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys EddyHawk
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Cat Okita
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea ianG
[Cryptography] Vulnerability of RSA vs. DLP to single-bit faults Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Introducing the phone-directory certificate Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys Philip Gladstone
[Cryptography] Checking for the inadvertent use of test keys ianG
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea Grant Schultz
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Jon Callas
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea Ben Laurie
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Stephen Farrell
[Cryptography] NSA looking for quantum-computing resistant encryption. How will encryption be affected by quantum computing Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea Grant Schultz
[Cryptography] Elgamal Variant Nathaniel McCallum
[Cryptography] Elgamal Variant Nathaniel McCallum
Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on an idea Ángel González
[Cryptography] Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Apple�s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Allen Schaaf
[Cryptography] Apples iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] Apple’s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Apple’s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Allen
[Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Apple?s iMessage Defense Against Spying Has One Flaw John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] Elgamal Variant Nathaniel McCallum
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Henry Baker
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently John Kelsey
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Paul Ferguson
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Allen
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Henry Baker
[Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [jensg at ist.psu.edu: [fc-announce] FC 2016 - Call for Papers + Announcements] R. Hirschfeld
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] "Ulysses pacts": better than "warrant canaries" ? Peter Fairbrother
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Let's Encrypt: Hello World! Jeroen van der Ham
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Henry Baker
[Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised John Young
[Cryptography] [cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] [cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised John Young
[Cryptography] Let's Encrypt: Hello World! Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Joachim Strömbergson
[Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Keys Compromised Nicholas Cole
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Henry Baker
[Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] JYA and Cryptome Passphrase Are Secure John Young
[Cryptography] sibyl attacks Henry Baker
[Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Key Compromise Related to Architectural Work Not Cryptome John Young
[Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities Dave Howe
[Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data Dave Howe
[Cryptography] The default password of '1234' Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] WashPo: Leaked NSC Memo on Encryption Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data Henry Baker
[Cryptography] An Open Source Analysis of NSA Cryptologic Capabilities Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] The default password of '1234' Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] FBI: Weaker Encryption Is a Worthwhile Tradeoff for Law Enforcement Access to Data Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Python Rumpelstiltskin-tree library + demo tool Rob Meijer
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Natanael
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently ianG
[Cryptography] The default password of '1234' ianG
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Devin Reade
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Devin Reade
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Rob S.
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Benjamin Kreuter
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently Kevin W. Wall
[Cryptography] Microsoft's new, free, crypto library dubbed FourQ Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Ilya Kasnacheev
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Howard Chu
[Cryptography] An observation on a Skipjack-style Feistel network Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] Feedback welcome on autentication/password replacement idea Howard Chu
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Florian Weimer
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ilya Kasnacheev
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently WebDawg
[Cryptography] The default password of '1234' Paul Madore
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Comey: targeted ads => plaintext access Christian Huitema
[Cryptography] Sixteen chars crashes chrome.... Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Sixteen chars crashes chrome.... Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] millions of Ashley Madison bcrypt hashes cracked efficiently arxlight
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Bill Cox
[Cryptography] TRR: Anonymization Technology for Bitcoin Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ilya Kasnacheev
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Davy Durham
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Guus Sliepen
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Natanael
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Curious about FIDO Alliance authentication scheme Thierry Moreau
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Bill Cox
[Cryptography] ADMIN: Rules for posting to the Cryptography List Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Philipp Gühring
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Kristian Gjøsteen
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Jonathan Thornburg
[Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system Bill Cox
[Cryptography] rejecting 3rd party web accesses/cookies John Gilmore
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Bill Frantz
[Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Davy Durham
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Non-Authenticated Key Agreement Bill Cox
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Phillip Hallam-Baker
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Aram Perez
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Chris Tonkinson
[Cryptography] Happy birthday, James Ellis! Dave Horsfall
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Darkpassenger
[Cryptography] WashPo: Obama admin backdoor proposals Henry Baker
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? John Denker
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Salz, Rich
[Cryptography] Yet another dumb crypto system Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Cycles overhead for TLS Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Natanael
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] GCHQ Cryptome surveillance Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Wrongware: was VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? dj at deadhat.com
[Cryptography] NSA/GCHQ put their heads together to discuss encryption on the net root
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? John-Mark Gurney
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious Ryan Carboni
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Jerry Leichter
[Cryptography] Follow up on my password replacement idea Ilya Kasnacheev
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious Peter Gutmann
[Cryptography] [FORGED] Brainpool Curves Found to Be Suspicious Tony Arcieri
[Cryptography] Google AdSense vuln de-obfuscates ad links for click fraud Henry Baker
[Cryptography] VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Tom Mitchell
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP phm
[Cryptography] The default password of '1234' ianG
[Cryptography] ADMIN Re: VW/EPA tests as crypto protocols ? Tamzen Cannoy
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Paul Wouters
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Ralf Senderek
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Michael Kjörling
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Allen
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Nicolai
[Cryptography] Why is ECC secure? Bill Cox
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Ron Garret
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow Henry Baker
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Werner Koch
[Cryptography] Why is ECC secure? Viktor Dukhovni
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP phm
[Cryptography] Future GPG/PGP Ray Dillinger
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow Fearghas McKay
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow Watson Ladd
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow John Levine
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow Paul Ferguson
[Cryptography] Insecure Chip 'n' PIN starts tomorrow Allen
[Cryptography] blockchain and trustworthy computing ianG

Last message date: Wed Sep 30 23:22:10 EDT 2015
Archived on: Wed Sep 30 23:37:56 EDT 2015

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