October 2016 Archives by thread

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Starting: Sat Oct 1 03:47:25 EDT 2016
Ending: Mon Oct 31 12:38:58 EDT 2016
Messages: 234

• [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Peter Gutmann
  • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   John Denker
    • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Mansour Moufid
  • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   ianG
  • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Florian Weimer
  • [Cryptography] another security vulnerability / travesty   Jon Callas
• [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Florian Weimer
  • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ben Laurie
    • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Thierry Moreau
      • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Kent Borg
    • [Cryptography] Use Linux for its security   Henry Baker
• [Cryptography] Posting the keys/certs for: Two distinct DSA keys sign a file with the same signature. Is this repudiation issue?   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] Posting the keys/certs for: Two distinct DSA keys sign a file with the same signature. Is this repudiation issue?   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Posting the keys/certs for: Two distinct DSA keys sign a file with the same signature. Is this repudiation issue?   Tony Arcieri
• [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Bowen
    • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Georgi Guninski
    • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Tamzen Cannoy
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ralf Senderek
    • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] identification / authentication / trust / authorization +- PKI +- CA   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   ianG
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Salz, Rich
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Bowen
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   ianG
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Stephen Farrell
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
  • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Jeroen van der Ham
    • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Georgi Guninski
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Christian Huitema
      • [Cryptography] distrusted root CA: WoSign   Ben Laurie
• [Cryptography] Short segment on the Stossel show on digital security issues.   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   ianG
  • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ray Dillinger
  • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   John Ioannidis
    • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ben Tasker
      • [Cryptography] phone firmware ... to mod, or not to mod? That is the question.   John Denker
      • [Cryptography] phone firmware ... to mod, or not to mod? That is the question.   William Muriithi
      • [Cryptography] phone firmware ... to mod, or not to mod? That is the question.   J.M. Porup
      • [Cryptography] phone firmware ... to mod, or not to mod? That is the question.   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Allen
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ben Tasker
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   mok-kong shen
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] Insecure email might be an even bigger problem than we suspected   mok-kong shen
• [Cryptography] Happy birthday, Martin Hellman!   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] Recommendations for short AES passphrases   ianG
• [Cryptography] ADMIN: No personal comments, please...   Perry E. Metzger
• [Cryptography] Debunking the "SMTP TLS "s a mess" myth.   Viktor Dukhovni
  • [Cryptography] Debunking the "SMTP TLS "s a mess" myth.   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] Debunking the "SMTP TLS "s a mess" myth.   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] Debunking the "SMTP TLS "s a mess" myth.   Viktor Dukhovni
      • [Cryptography] Debunking the "SMTP TLS "s a mess" myth.   Roland C. Dowdeswell
• [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Rick Nakroshis
    • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Watson Ladd
    • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Peter Todd
  • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying CVC   Michael Kjörling
  • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Howard Chu
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   RB
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Howard Chu
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Tom Mitchell
    • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   Cat Okita
    • [Cryptography] French credit card has time-varying PIN   John Levine
• [Cryptography] Exploring Encryption and Potential Mechanisms for Authorized Government Access to Plaintext   Aram Perez
• [Cryptography] Reuters: Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence - sources   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Reuters: Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence - sources   Henry Baker
    • [Cryptography] Reuters: Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence - sources   Perry E. Metzger
      • [Cryptography] Reuters: Yahoo secretly scanned customer emails for U.S. intelligence - sources   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Signal now does desktops...   Perry E. Metzger
  • [Cryptography] Signal now does desktops...   Tom Mitchell
• [Cryptography] Should NSA & Cyber Command Have Separate Leadership?   Jim Windle
  • [Cryptography] Should NSA & Cyber Command Have Separate Leadership?   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] Should NSA & Cyber Command Have Separate Leadership?   John Denker
• [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   Bill Frantz
  • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   John Gilmore
    • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   Reed Loden
      • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   dj at deadhat.com
    • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] NIST Video: Cybersecurity Fatigue   John Young
      • [Cryptography] Security Fatigue   Jerry Leichter
• [Cryptography] Suggestion that a bad crypto tool led to a wide-scale roll-up?   ianG
• [Cryptography] BP in the media again   Dave Horsfall
  • [Cryptography] BP in the media again   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] NYTimes: Surveillance and Encryption in the Post-Obama Era   John Young
• [Cryptography] Senator Ron Wyden Discusses Encryption, Data Privacy and Security   John Young
• [Cryptography] Would anybody like to participate in a Bletchley Park wargame?   Ray Dillinger
• [Cryptography] Zcash Open Source Miner Challenge   Zooko Wilcox-OHearn
• [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Jim Windle
  • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   ianG
    • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Peter Todd
      • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Natanael
      • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Ben Laurie
      • [Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?   Peter Todd
• [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Georgi Guninski
  • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Ray Dillinger
    • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Stephen Farrell
    • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   james hughes
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] [FORGED] Re: "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Mike Hamburg
    • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Mike Hamburg
    • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   David Johnston
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Jan Dušátko
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Jan Dušátko
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Peter Gutmann
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Ron Garret
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Jerry Leichter
      • [Cryptography] Defending against weak/trapdoored keys   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Sebastian Krahmer
    • [Cryptography] "NSA could put undetectable “trapdoors” in millions of crypto keys"   Hanno Böck
• [Cryptography] How the NSA broke trillions of encrypted connections   Tamzen Cannoy
  • [Cryptography] How the NSA broke trillions of encrypted connections   Hanno Böck
    • [Cryptography] How the NSA broke trillions of encrypted connections   Joshua Marpet
      • [Cryptography] constructing and exploiting trapdoored DH/DSA primes for 1024-bit keys is feasible   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Joshua Marpet
    • [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Theodore Ts'o
      • [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Ron Garret
  • [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   grarpamp
    • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Pavol Rusnak
      • [Cryptography] [Crypto-practicum] Announcement: the SC4-HSM is now a FIDO U2F token   Ron Garret
• [Cryptography] changing crypto policy   L Jean Camp
  • [Cryptography] changing crypto policy? Not Deborah Ross   John Gilmore
  • [Cryptography] Security properties of unkeyed hash functions   Francisco Corella
• [Cryptography] PQ Crypto: new hash-bases signature schemes   Jota J
• [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Henry Baker
  • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Bill Frantz
    • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Bill Frantz
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Henry Baker
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Florian Weimer
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   ianG
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Jon Callas
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   grarpamp
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   John Levine
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Phillip Hallam-Baker
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   John Gilmore
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Jonathan Thornburg
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Ray Dillinger
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Tom Mitchell
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Mark Seiden
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Steve Furlong
    • [Cryptography] TFC - instant messaging with endpoint security   Markus Ottela
    • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Dave Horsfall
      • [Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered   Michael Kjörling
• [Cryptography] Chinese firm admits its hacked DVRs, cameras were behind Friday's massive DDOS attack   Aram Perez
• [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Francisco Corella
  • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Jerry Leichter
    • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Francisco Corella
      • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Natanael
  • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Tony Arcieri
    • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Francisco Corella
  • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   ianG
    • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Peter Gutmann
    • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   alex at alten.org
      • [Cryptography] A PKI without CRLs or OCSP   Peter Gutmann
• [Cryptography] Tommy Flowers   Dave Horsfall
• [Cryptography] "Google teaches “AIs” to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   Jerry Leichter
  • [Cryptography] "Google teaches “AIs” to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   Ron Garret
    • [Cryptography] "Google teaches “AIs” to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   Erik Granger
  • [Cryptography] "Google teaches “AIs” to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   Tom Mitchell
  • [Cryptography] "Google teaches “AIs” to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   Kevin W. Wall
  • [Cryptography] "Google teaches ???AIs??? to invent their own crypto and avoid eavesdropping"   John-Mark Gurney
• [Cryptography] Nundrum cipher = hypothetical WWII cipher machine = can Enigma/Tunny be fixed?   John Denker
  • [Cryptography] Nundrum cipher = hypothetical WWII cipher machine = can Enigma/Tunny be fixed?   Kent Borg

Last message date: Mon Oct 31 12:38:58 EDT 2016
Archived on: Mon Oct 31 13:29:59 EDT 2016

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