[Cryptography] How to prove Wikileaks' emails aren't altered

[Florian Weimer]

* John Levine:

> PS:
>
>>This means that in a case where someone has hacked a system, if they
>> have the email stores, they probably also have the DKIM signing
>> key. If they have
>>the DKIM signing key they can create whatever messages they want and
>> sign them, with backdating and anything else they want.
>
> In this case it's well documented that bad guys phished John Podesta
> and took over his account to download all of his mail.  There is no
> evidence of a compromise at gmail itself.

The messages contain signed timestamps, so if they are indeed forged,
then a lot of planning went into this.  And to avoid detection, you'd
have to prevent message delivery to the recipients (or at least
reading).  Sure, all this is possible in theory, but it seems a bit
far-fetched.