[Cryptography] Blockchain to Secure Nuclear Weapons?

[Natanael]

Den 13 okt 2016 11:50 skrev "Ben Laurie" <ben at links.org>:
>
> On 13 October 2016 at 01:54, Peter Todd <pete at petertodd.org> wrote:
> > This is similar to how Certificate Transparency must be more than just
> > timestamping to give the auditability guarantees it attempts to provide.
>
> Curious what gap you think there is? Or do you mean CT does provide
> the "more" that is needed?

The gap is the ability vs lack of ability to say that there's no data being
hidden from you, the ability to know when you have access to one entry that
there is no entries that conflict with yours.

A pure timestamping service has no concept of conflicts or versioning.
There's no concept of exclusivity or "rivalry". But in Bitcoin's blockchain
you can't spend an UTXO twice, in Certificate Transparency you can't issue
two separate certificates for one domain undetected (revocations are also
tracked).

Factom (works on top of Bitcoin) goes even further, when you look up
entries you should be able to confirm that what you hold is the latest
version, or to otherwise find the one correct latest version. It ensures
there's only one active version at a time, no forking. Each new one
replaces the previous one. They call it proof of process.
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