July 2010 Archives by date

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Starting: Thu Jul 1 00:46:30 EDT 2010
Ending: Sat Jul 31 21:42:16 EDT 2010
Messages: 251

• 1280-Bit RSA   Dan Kaminsky
• Intel to also add RNG   Eugen Leitl
• Merkle-Winternitz-HORS signature scheme for Tahoe-LAFS   David-Sarah Hopwood
• Merkle-Winternitz-HORS signature scheme for Tahoe-LAFS [correction]   David-Sarah Hopwood
• Chaocipher Revealed   I)ruid
• Spy/Counterspy   Pawel
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Jonathan Katz
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Greg Rose
• A Fault Attack Construction Based On Rijmen's Chosen-Text Relations Attack   Jonathan Katz
• [TIME_WARP] 1280-Bit RSA   Brandon Enright
• [TIME_WARP] 1280-Bit RSA   Dan Kaminsky
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Steven Bellovin
• [TIME_WARP] 1280-Bit RSA   Jonathan Thornburg
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Jerry Leichter
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Peter Gutmann
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Peter Gutmann (alt)
• Spy/Counterspy   Jerry Leichter
• What is required for trust?   Jerry Leichter
• A real case of malicious steganography in the wild?   Jerry Leichter
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   Chris Palmer
• Question w.r.t. AES-CBC IV   David Wagner
• 1280-Bit RSA   Brandon Enright
• [cryptography] What's the state of the art in factorization?   Francois Grieu
• Spy/Counterspy   Christoph Gruber
• 1280-Bit RSA   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• 1280-Bit RSA   Samuel Neves
• Spy/Counterspy   Ben Laurie
• Spy/Counterspy   Jerry Leichter
• Location services risks (was: Re: Spy/Counterspy)   John Ioannidis
• Anyone make any sense out of this skype hack announcement?   Perry E. Metzger
• Fw: [IP] DARPA BAA on homomorphic encryption   Perry E. Metzger
• Intel to also add RNG   Ben Laurie
• Intel to also add RNG   Richard Salz
• Intel to also add RNG   Paul Wouters
• Intel to also add RNG   Peter Gutmann
• Intel to also add RNG   Perry E. Metzger
• Intel to also add RNG   Matt Crawford
• Intel to also add RNG   Jack Lloyd
• Anyone make any sense out of this skype hack announcement?   Tom McGhan
• Intel to also add RNG   Eric Murray
• Intel to also add RNG   Nicolas Williams
• Fwd: Anyone make any sense out of this skype hack announcement?   Christian Collberg
• Anyone make any sense out of this skype hack announcement?   Steve Furlong
• Intel to also add RNG   Paul Wouters
• Intel to also add RNG   Eric Murray
• 1280-Bit RSA   James A. Donald
• Call for Papers: CPSRT 2010 - Deadlines Extended!   George Yee
• Intel to also add RNG   Peter Gutmann
• Fwd: Anyone make any sense out of this skype hack announcement?   Peter Gutmann
• Intel to also add RNG   Francois Grieu
• Intel to also add RNG   Thor Lancelot Simon
• Encryption and authentication modes   Florian Weimer
• Intel to also add RNG   Ben Laurie
• Encryption and authentication modes   dj at deadhat.com
• Encryption and authentication modes   james hughes
• new tech report on easy-to-use IPsec   Steven Bellovin
• Fw: [IP] Two new rulings on Internet anonymity   Perry E. Metzger
• Encryption and authentication modes   markus reichelt
• Encryption and authentication modes   Matt Ball
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Perry E. Metzger
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Thierry Moreau
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Taral
• Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Jakob Schlyter
• Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Thierry Moreau
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Paul Wouters
• Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Paul Hoffman
• Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Thierry Moreau
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Taral
• Fw: Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com
• Root Zone DNSSEC Deployment Technical Status Update   Steven Bellovin
• ANNOUNCING Tahoe, the Least-Authority File System, v1.7.1   Zooko O'Whielacronx
• A Fault Attack Construction Based On Rijmen's Chosen-Text Relations Attack   Alfonso De Gregorio
• A Fault Attack Construction Based On Rijmen's Chosen-Text Relations Attack   David Wagner
• [gdane at microsoft.com: [fc-announce] Call for papers: Financial Cryptography and Data Security (FC2011)]   R. Hirschfeld
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• What if you had a very good entropy source, but only practical at crypto engine installation time?   Thierry Moreau
• Encryption and authentication modes   David McGrew
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• ADMIN: your wonderful anti-spam software   Perry E. Metzger
• What if you had a very good patent lawyer...   John Gilmore
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   David-Sarah Hopwood
• Encryption and authentication modes   Florian Weimer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• What if you had a very good patent lawyer...   Bill Squier
• What if you had a very good patent lawyer...   Nicolas Williams
• Encryption and authentication modes   David McGrew
• Encryption and authentication modes   Chris Palmer
• Encryption and authentication modes   David Wagner
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• Encryption and authentication modes   Justin Troutman
• Intel to also add RNG   Sandy Harris
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Steven Bellovin
• A Fault Attack Construction Based On Rijmen's Chosen-Text Relations Attack   Bill Frantz
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Perry E. Metzger
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Chris Palmer
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Donald Eastlake
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Perry E. Metzger
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Donald Eastlake
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Florian Weimer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Jay Sakata
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Perry E. Metzger
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Perry E. Metzger
• MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Sampo Syreeni
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Sampo Syreeni
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Ralph Holz
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Pat Farrell
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   dan at geer.org
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Jack Lloyd
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Sampo Syreeni
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   dan at geer.org
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Chris Palmer
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Stephan Neuhaus
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Jerry Leichter
• Fwd: Introduction, plus: Open Transactions -- digital cash library   R.A. Hettinga
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Stefan Kelm
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Stefan Kelm
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Jack Lloyd
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• deliberately crashing ancient computers (was: Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI)   Jonathan Thornburg
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Ben Laurie
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• deliberately crashing ancient computers (was: Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI)   Jack Lloyd
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• Introduction, plus: Open Transactions -- digital cash library   R.A. Hettinga
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Alexandre Dulaunoy
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Paul Tiemann
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Perry E. Metzger
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Sampo Syreeni
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   dan at geer.org
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   Arshad Noor
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Pat Farrell
• Fwd: Introduction, plus: Open Transactions -- digital cash library   Ian G
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Alexandre Dulaunoy
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   James A. Donald
• deliberately crashing ancient computers (was: Re: A mighty fortress is our PKI)   Jerry Leichter
• SHA256 reduced to 112 bits?   Paul Wouters
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   StealthMonger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Nicolas Williams
• Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.   Perry E. Metzger
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   Richard Salz
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   Nicolas Williams
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   Paul Wouters
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   Thierry Moreau
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   John Denker
• Persisting /dev/random state across reboots   Thomas
• A slight modification of my comments on PKI.   Stephan Neuhaus
• A mighty fortress is our PKI   Peter Gutmann
• Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.   Stefan Kelm
• Hashing messages with lengths between 32 and 128 bytes is one of the most important practical issue (was Re: the skein hash function)   Paul
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Peter Gutmann
• Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.   Perry E. Metzger
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Obama administration seeks warrantless access to email headers.   Steven Bellovin
• A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II   Bill Stewart
• About that "Mighty Fortress"... What's it look like?   Ray Dillinger
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Peter Gutmann
• init.d/urandom : saving random-seed   John Denker
• About that "Mighty Fortress"... What's it look like?   Perry E. Metzger
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Perry E. Metzger
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   John Levine
• init.d/urandom : saving random-seed   Guus Sliepen
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Guus Sliepen
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Peter Gutmann
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Adam Shostack
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Jakob Schlyter
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Chris Palmer
• init.d/urandom : saving random-seed   John Denker
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Steven Bellovin
• Venona   Steven Bellovin
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Perry E. Metzger
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Anne & Lynn Wheeler
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Nicolas Williams
• Five Theses on Security Protocols   Jeffrey I. Schiller
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Jeffrey I. Schiller
• Is this the first ever practically-deployed use of a threshold scheme?   Jonathan Katz

Last message date: Sat Jul 31 21:42:16 EDT 2010
Archived on: Sun Aug 7 18:26:44 EDT 2011

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