MITM attack against WPA2-Enterprise?

[Chris Palmer]

Perry E. Metzger writes:

> All in all, this looks bad for anyone depending on WPA2 for high security.

Luckily, that describes nobody, right?

;D

I used to think that non-end-to-end security mechanisms were wastefully
pointless, but adorably harmless. However, in my experience people keep
using link-layer garbage (and network-layer trash, and support protocol
junk) as a way to put off the hard work of real (i.e. E2E) security.
Non-E2E stuff hurts usability, availability, and security (by creating a
false sense).

Of course, we E2E fans have to get our usable security ducks in a row first.

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