A mighty fortress is our PKI, Part II

[Ben Laurie]

On 24/07/2010 18:55, Peter Gutmann wrote:
> - PKI dogma doesn't even consider availability issues but expects the
>   straightforward execution of the condition "problem -> revoke cert".  For a
>   situation like this, particularly if the cert was used to sign 64-bit
>   drivers, I wouldn't have revoked because the global damage caused by that is
>   potentially much larger than the relatively small-scale damage caused by the
>   malware.  So alongside "too big to fail" we now have "too widely-used to
>   revoke".  Is anyone running x64 Windows with revocation checking enabled and
>   drivers signed by the Realtek or JMicron certs?

One way to mitigate this would be to revoke a cert on a date, and only
reject signatures on files you received after that date.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
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"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
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